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Summary  findings
ITranisition  economies have introduced a range of OECD  Limited funds for active labor policies might best be
active labor market policies to combat unemployment-  spent retraining the most able unemployed workers to
albeit often on paper only, as with rising unemployment  develop skills needed in the private sector.
passive policies have crowded out active ones. But even  Public employment programs might be targeted
in the Czech Republic, active labor market policies have  especially to problem groups of workers and to the long-
contributed only marginally to reducing unemployment,  term unemployed - more for reasons of equity than of
One task for policymakers in Central and Eastern  efficiency. The point is to have a clear idea whether both
Europe  must be to convey the message that, even under  aims of efficiency and equity can be pursued and, if
the best  circumstances, active labor policies can play only  efficiency gains are unrealistic, whether equity
a marginal role in reducing unemployment.  considerations are politically indispensable.
OECD labor policies cannot be applied mechanically  Because nontradable services are underdeveloped,
in Central and Eastern  Europe because the situation  Central and Eastern European countries might eliminate
there is different. Severe and persistent shortages in  credit rationing that discourages self-employment (the
capital and managerial ability are sure to keep labor  self-employed have trouble getting financing).
demand weak in the medium term, while labor supply  Improving consulting services for the unemployed in
will he abundant. As enterprises are restructured and  Hungary, Poland, and Russia makes more sense than
liquidated, the newly unemployed workers cannot be  applying a broad menu of OECD programs.
absorbed by the weak private sector and must compete  The labor market in the Russian Federation appears to
for scarce jobs. Women and older, less  educated men  be more dynamic than in Hungary and Poland, but this is
have particular trouble  finding work.  probably because of massive labor hoarding in Russian
Which active labor policies does Lehmann suggest  enterprises. Once they start shedding labor in earnest,
might be effective?  their employment figures will look more like those in the
other Central and Eastern European countries.
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Since the beginning of their transition  to a market  economy  the economies  of Central
and  Eastern Europe (CEE) experienced a  sharp rise  in  open unemployment,
reaching comparable levels to  the worse performing economies of  the  OECD. 2
Having had continuous difficulties with the fight against inflation, governments in
CEE had thus far few possibilities to reflate their economies and have tried from
early on to combat  the incidence  of unemployment  with active labour market policies
(ALMPs). The  rise  of  unemployment has,  however, increasingly involved the
"crowding  out " of resources  for ALMPs in favour of unemployment  benefit payments.
Nevertheless, it  seems worthwhile to discuss ALMPs in transition economies, as
they can play a role at the margin in the fight against unemployment.  Such policies
are here understood in the narrow  sense of policies targeted at the unemployed  and
those threatened  by redundancies.  Clearly, sound macroeconomic  policies, policies
inducing large foreign direct investment and the existence of a political and social
consensus  about how to distribute the costs of transition are crucial for rapid growth
and thus more employment. The issue of modernisation  of state-owned  enterprises
(SOE's) via foreign direct investment and its effect on employment  will be briefly
touched upon, citing the example of eastern Germany. The analysis is restricted
also in so far as partial equilibrium effects of ALMPs will be the main interest when
evaluating such policies. Given the very limited size of active policies in virtually all
transition  countries general equilibrium  effects  should  for the most part be negligible.
There have been exhaustive  surveys of ALMPs in OECD countries in the literature
(most recently, OECD (1993), ch.2 and Bjorklund et al. (1991)). Section II contains
a  brief  discussion  of  the  merits  of  transplanting ALMPs  developed to  fight
unernployment  in mature market  economies  to CEE.
2 The  main  exception  to  this statement  is the  Czech  Republic  where  open  unemployment  has  stayed
very  low  throughout  the  transition.3
Section III analyses the mix of passive and active labour market policies and the
specific ALMPs  instruments in  economies of  transition. The  Czech  Republic,
Hungary  and Poland  will be discussed  as concrete  examples.
The evaluation of ALMPs in these countries will be attempted  in section IV. As data
availability and quality varies, this will be done using different approaches. For
Hungary  evaluation studies using micro  data have already been undertaken  and the
main  results  of  these  studies will  be  presented and  discussed. For  Poland
augmented matching functions will be estimated using administrative data with the
aim to  establish whether there  is  a  positive correlation between the  level  of
participants in a measure and the flow of hirings.  Additionally, "problem groups"
among the  unemployed will  be  identified using  stock variables and  estimated
transition probabilities calculated from the Polish LFS data.  Furthermore,  the raw
data from the Supplement  on Labour Market Policies attached to the August 1994
Polish  LFS  (Lehmann and  Wadsworth, 1995) will  be  used  for  a  preliminary
evaluation of Polish ALMPs.  The situation with Czech micro data availability looks
somewhat  less promising. To my knowledge  there are no serious attempts thus far
to evaluate the effectiveness  of Czech  ALMPs, using such data. Burda and Lubyova
(1995) have estimated augmented  matching  functions for the Czech Republic using
regional administrative  data.  They show convincingly  that ALMPs could have only
marginally affected the unemployment  rate in that country. Especially interesting is,
therefore, a general assessment  of the situation in the Czech labour market.  This
assessment tries to identify all the determinants  of the low unemployment  rate.  The
effects of Czech ALMPs  will then be seen in this broader  context.
The possible lessons that the Russian  Federation  might learn from the experience
of the three above mentioned Central European countries will be discussed in
Section V while section VI concludes.
11  The  Applicability of  OECD Active Labour Market Policies in  Transition
Economies
In  OECD countries the following programme categories are considered part  of
ALMPs:
a. public employment  services ("job brokerage")  and administration;
b. labour market  training;
c. youth measures;4
d. subsidised  employment;
e. measures  for the disabled.
In most transition economies all these categories have been introduced, with the
emphasis varying from country to country.  The merits of measures a and e are
straightforward  in both OECD and transition countries.  What is interesting  from a
theoretical point of view is whether active measures  from categories b,c and d can
have the same functions in transition economies  as in mature capitalist economies
and whether they can, consequently,  be evaluated  in a similar fashion.
Abstracting from counter-cyclical  employment  measures,  ALMPs in OECD countries
like b,c and d seek  to integrate  marginal social groups or to reintegrate  marginalized
groups into the labour market. Whilst the large majority  of the labour force are con-
tinuously employed, certain groups with relatively loose labour market attachment
and/or very low human capital experience great difficulties in gaining permanent
employment  (e.g. some school leavers, older unskilled  workers, women, minorities).
By participating in a training or subsidised  employment  scheme,  the human capital of
"marginal"  persons  can  be  increased  and  their  labour  market  attachment
strengthened thus boosting the probability of employment  or re-employment. The
economic rationale behind the  application of  such measures is  an  attempt to
increase  the effective labour supply.  Such an increase can also be caused by the
re-integration of persons who have lost their job because of structural shocks or
because  of a deep recession. With unusually large inflows into unemployment  many
of those made redundant may experience a very long spell of unemployment  and
consequently  be discriminated  against by prospective  employers. Integration  or re-
integration of "problem persons" into the labour force increases effective labour
supply and ceteris paribus lowers the equilibrium wage and thus increases overall
employment. ALMPs which successfully  increase the effective labour supply can,
during  the expansionary  phase of the business  cycle, contribute  to the dampening  of
inflationary pressures (Calmfors, 1994)  and/or help  in  the  solution of  partial
hysteresis  of unemployment  due to long-term  unemployment  (Layard, et al., 1991).
In OECD countries, a second feature of measures like b,c and d  is a means of
reducing mismatch  by skill or region  (Padoa-Schioppa,  1991).
When evaluating measures  like b,c and d in OECD  countries  the following questions
are typically asked:5
- did the schemes target the groups identified as those having problems leaving
unemployment?
- did participation in a scheme enhance individuals'  productivity expressing itself
in higher wages?
- did the measure  increase  the average  re-employment  probability of participants?
- have distortive effects, e.g. substitution-, dead weight-, displacement-of-output-
and fiscal substitution  effects,  been minimised?
These questions are also relevant in transition countries.  However, some stylised
facts of  labour markets in transition need to  be recalled when  discussing the
targeting issue.  Labour markets in transition economies are characterised, apart
from the  Czech Republic and possibly Russia, by a  low demand for  labour, a
stagnant  unemployment pool,  rising  long-term  unemployment and  tougher
competition for  jobs  among the  unemployed than  in  most  OECD countries.
Moreover, a significant component of the unemployed,  and even of the long-term
unemployed,  have a strong labour market  attachment  and in some instances  a large
stock  of  accumulated human  capital.  Although their  work  profile  may  be
overspecialised  if not obsolete, they have the potential  for adapting relatively quickly
to  new tasks.  They may be therefore the typical target group for  measures like
further training and retraining. Most likely, it is not efficient to target the "problem-
groups"  (unskilled,  low-educated, older  workers, etc.) for  further  training  and
retraining as they, after the completion of the scheme,  will have to compete with a
large  pool of  unemployed who  are  probably better motivated and  certainly in
possession of much more accumulated human capital.  Instead, problem groups
could be targeted for public work programmes  and subsidised  employment  schemes.
The net distortive effects of ALMPs can be larger in transition economies than in
mature  western economies. For example,  most studies analysing  public employment
programmes for minorities in the  US have found large fiscal substitution effects.
These were mitigated, though, by an increase in equity as minority persons were
employed by local authorities instead of persons from the core of the employment
pool.  The latter  found employment  outside the public sector with relative ease.  In
transition economies, in contrast, even persons from the core of the employment
pool have great problems  finding re-employment  once they flow into unemployment. 3
For example, nurses who are substituted by persons on the intervention works
scheme (wage subsidy scheme) in Polish municipal  hospitals are in general not re-
3  The Czech  Republic and Russia might also  here be exceptions.6
employable in the private sector.  Thus fiscal substitution effects can be more
detrimental  in transition economies  than in OECD  countries.
One strand of policies contributing to the solution of regional mismatch in OECD
countries  focuses  on  helping  the  unemployed move  to  regions  with  better
employment opportunities.  Further training and re-training schemes can be an
important ingredient in such policies, although more direct interventions by gov-
ernment like subsidising public housing in high opportunity  regions and government
contributions  to moving  expenses  are more  prominent  components  of OECD  policies
intent on "taking the workers to the work" (Jackman,  1995). As there are very high
barriers  to  mobility  in  transition  economies 4 ALMPs  like  further  training  and
retraining which in OECD countries also increase the mobility of workers might be
rather ineffective  when combating  regional mismatch  in CEE.
The second strand  of regional policies of "bringing work to the workers", i.e. creating
jobs in high unemployment  regions, involves  investment  grants or subsidies to firms
if they locate or undertake new capital investment in such regions.  As nearly all
governments in transition economies have severe budgetary problems and these
traditional regional policies are very expensive,  it is inconceivable  that such policies
will solve regional mismatch  to any degree in transition economies. What might be
relatively useful  in  this  context, though,  is  the  targeting of  subsidised public
employment  in high unemployment  regions.
Further training and  retraining is  in  principal an important tool to  combat skill
mismatch  in transition economies. However,  in the light of the above stylised facts
of  labour markets in  transition  it  seems questionable whether targeting these
measures  at identified problem  groups can be efficient.
In the fight against long-term  unemployment  the Restart Programme  in Britain seems
to  be an especially effective tool.  The  long-term unemployed are  invited to  a
counselling interview which is supposed to help the long-term  unemployed  find out
about available vacancies and training courses. Such an interview might also help
employment  offices weed out those who are not interested  in taking up work.  Both
White and Lakey (1992) and Lehmann  (1993a)  find that in Britain the stock of long-
41ecause  there is a severe housing constraint  inherited  from the old regime and to date no housing
policy exists, which could help promote the  movement of workers to  high opportunity regions,
transition economies are characterised  by such high barriers to mobility (cf. Boeri and Scarpetta,
1995). The available empirical evidence  from the supplement  to the August 1994  wave of the Polish
LFS (G6ra and Sztanderska,  1995) shows  virtually no inter-voivodship  mobility while, for the Czech
Republic,  Erbenova (1995)  finds that people  commute but do not n-ove to high opportunity  regions.7
term unemployment  has been substantially reduced through the application of the
Restart Programme.  Other OECD countries have, consequently, adopted similar
measures  to fight long-term  unemployment  (e.g. Germany  and Ireland). In transition
economies large programmes  similar to Restart do not exist yet, even though long-
term  unemployment is  clearly one  of  the major problems.  Whether the  more
conventional  forms of ALMP (b, c and d) which are applied in transition economies
are, on the other hand, effective  might be doubtful  in the light of the above presented
stylised  facts.
III Active Labour Market  Policies  in the Czech Republic,  Hungary  and Poland
Tables 1 and 2 show public expenditure and participant inflows in labour market
programmes  for Hungary  and the Czech Republic. In these tables the classification
of the OECD is used when describing labour market policy measures. The Polish
data will be presented  and discussed  separately  below. When inspecting  the tables
one should keep in mind the differences  in the unemployment  rates for Hungary  and
the Czech Republic  for the years 1992 and 1993. (12.3 and 12.1  for Hungary  versus
2.9 and 3.1 for the Czech Republic).
Looking at the expenditure patterns of OECD countries (cf. OECD (1993), Table
2.B.1 and Chart 2.1) two points stick out. With the exception  of Sweden  all countries
with a substantial unemployment  rate spend more on passive than active policies.
With this being the case expenditures  are higher the higher the unemployment  rate.
It,  therefore,  comes  as  no  surprise  that  Hungary with  its  relatively  high
unemployment  rate has expenditures  on labour market policies which are (in terms
of percent of GDP) comparable to many OECD countries. Among those countries
which in 1992 had similar unemployment rates as Hungary only  Belgium spent
decisively more on labour market programmes  in general and on ALMPs. Britain, on
the other hand, having an average unemployment  rate of 10% in that year spent
somewhat  less on total labour  market  policies and a lot less on ALMPs  than Hungary
(!), while Canada spent exactly the same percentage of GDP. This international
comparison certainly leads to the conclusion that as far as expenditures on the
labour market are concerned Hungary does not perform worse than most OECD
countries.
The Czech Republic, on the other hand , has for the reported period spent less on
labour market policies than virtually all OECD countries if our GDP measure is8
used. 5 For the period 1990-916  Japan's expenditure  on labour market policies was
0.45% of GDP. The other "low spender" among the OECD countries, Switzerland,
spent 0.39% of GDP in 1990 and 0.63% of GDP in 1991. Both these countries had
extremely low  unemployment rates for  the  reported period.  Comparing Czech
expenditures  with the expenditures  of OECD  countries it seems,  therefore,  clear that
ALMPs cannot be the sole cause of the on average low unemployment  rate in the
Czech Republic relative to other transition economies. It is true that the Czech
Republic is the only country among  the Visegrad states which has a high proportion
of expenditure  on ALMPs throughout  the reported period and which has spent more
than 50% of total expenditure on ALMPs in 1992. Nevertheless, if ALMPs were
mainly responsible  for the low unemployment,  the Czech government  would have to
spend for active measures  on a level at least  comparable  to that of Sweden. In 1990-
91, when the Swedish  unemployment  rate was still similar to the unemployment  rate
of the Czech Republic, Sweden spent 1.69% of GDP on ALMPs, while the highest
Czech expenditures were 0.33% of  GDP in  1992.  Furthermore in  1993 when
expenditures on ALMPs fell relative to passive measures the unemployment rate
hardly increased.
However, when the unemployment  rate is within low bands as is the case in the
Czech Republic, ALMPs can have a dramatic effect on the unemployment  rate. The
changing expenditure  pattern  for 1991-1993  makes  this point. With de-registration  of
employment  schemes  participants  the big jump in expenditure  on such schemes  from
1991 to 1992 results in a fall of the unemployment  rate caused entirely by increased
outflows from unemployment. 7 In 1993 expenditure patterns became close again to
those of  1991. This seems a desirable development as the spending of  scarce
financial resources  on ALMPs to push the unemployment  rate from 3.1% to 2.9% is
certainly  somewhat odd.  The  government might  have  also  recognised  the
disincentive effects  of a too low unemployment  rate.
Summarising  this point, with low levels of unemployment  ALMPs could be used by
the Czech government  to have a marked effect on the overall unemployment  rate.
The for the whole period reported levels of unemployment  which are not only low
relative to  other transition economies but also relative to  most OECD countries
5 However,  in terms  of unemployment  expenditure  on  labour  market  policies  is quite  high.
6More  recent  data  are  not  available.
7According  to own calculations,  the unemployment  rate for 1992  would have been 5.1% in the
absence  of  theses  schemes  (assuming  no  substitution  effects  or dead  weight  losses).9
cannot, however, be explained entirely by ALMPs. Other determinants that might
have some  predictive power  will be discussed  in the next section.
Hungary  has a quite high proportion of expenditure  on public employment  services
and administration,  roughly comparable  with the "high spenders"  on this item in the
OECD group, while the Czech Republic has an average value for this category of
active policy. What  is especially interesting, though, is the fact that the Czech
Republic  spends only negligible amounts  on labour market  training and the vast bulk
of its funds designated for active measures on subsidised employment  and work
experience  for school leavers. Hungary seems to have a more balanced approach
with expenditure  on labour  market  training being an item of growing importance.  One
should add that although Hungarian  employment  offices also have to provide  further
training for youngsters who have only eight years of elementary schooling these
expenditures  are not included  in Table 1. The most important  Czech and Hungarian
ALMPs  are described in annex 1.
The  ratio  of  participant inflows  (as  a  percentage of  the  labour  force)  over
expenditure (as a percentage of  GDP) can be used as a rough measure of the
average quality of labour market  training. A high value implies  that on average many
participants have been put through training and/or the average  value added of such
courses has been low. Among the countries in the OECD  group where this measure
can be calculated not many  have a lower  value than Hungary.  Only Sweden  has with
4.6 in 1992 a clearly lower value, while countries like Germany and the  United
Kingdom have values that  are low relative to  many other OECD countries but
comparable  to the 6.3 and 5.91 Hungary has in 1992 and 1993. As Germany has
relatively lengthy training courses with on average substantial  value added this can
only mean that Hungarian labour market training is of relatively high quality. The
question  whether  this  labour  market  training  has  increased  re-employment
probabilities of the unemployed  cannot be addressed  with this type of analysis, it will
be pursued in the next section.  The Czech values of this measure  vary between 10
and 34, pointing to larger throughput  and/or lower human  capital enhancing content
than in the Hungarian  case.
Table 3 and 4 give Polish labour market policy expenditure for the years 1990 to
1993, while Table  5  presents the  yearly  participant inflows for  various  active
measures. The figures for  ALMPs expenditure in Table 3 are the official figures
published by  the  Polish Ministry of  Labour. They  are  strongly  inflated  since
apprenticeship training, undertaken in most coLintries  by the  regular educational
system, is  in  Poland  counted as  an  ALMP  measure. Having taken  out  the10
expenditure on apprenticeship  training the entries in the last row of Table 3 give
adjusted percentages of GDP which have been spent in Poland on ALMPs. With
somewhat  higher unemployment  rates than Hungary, Poland's overall expenditures
on  labour  market  policies  were  substantially lower  in  1992  and  1993.  The
expenditures on ALMPs were dramatically lower for Poland whether we take the
official or the adjusted  figures.
Analysing the adjusted figures, the percentage share of expenditures on ALMPs
from the "Labour Fund" 8 declined from 32.1% of the total in 1990  to 7% in 1991, fell
further to 4.7% in 1992 and recovered  slightly to 11.9% in 1993. The steady rise in
the number of unemployed  benefit recipients forced the governrnent until 1992 to
allocate an ever greater share of  total expenditures for  benefit payments. This
development  was slightly reversed since the beginning of 1993 when unemployment
benefits were no longer open-ended but cut off after 12 months. As far as ALMP
expenditures are concerned there has been a  shift  in the  composition of  the
measures  employed.  While in 1990 81% of ALMP expenditures  went on loans to set
up businesses 9, the share of this measure  fell to 43%, 21  % and 15% in 1991, 1992
and 1993 respectively. The share of Further Training and Retraining, on the other
hand, grew from 1% in 1990 to 10% in 1991, reached 17% in 1992 and fell back to
15% in 1993. "Intervention  Works" had a share of 18%,  47%, 45% and 39% in the
first four years of reform,  while Public Works were only introduced in 1992 and made
up 17% of all ALMP expenditures in that year and 34% in 1993. The last three
measures  whose combined  share of total ALMP expenditures  rose from 19% in 1990
to 85% in 1993 are briefly described in annex 1.
IV Evaluation  of Active Labour  Market Policies  in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland
1. How to evaluate  ALMPs in transition economies?
In a general framework the effectiveness of an ALMP scheme can, according to
mainstream  opinion, be assessed answering  the four questions  which have already
been raised in section 11.
8A fund  set up  by the Mazowiecki  government  in 1989  to  finance  expenditures  of passive  and  active
labour  market  policies.  A mandatory  contribution  from employers  (until  the end of 1992  2% of the
wage  bill,  from the  beginning  of 1993  3%  of  the  wage  bill) and  transfers  from  the central  budget  make
up  the bulk  of  the income  of  the Labour  Fund.
9This  type  of loan  is comparable  to  the British  Enterprise  Allowance  Scheme.1 1
To answer  the last question about distortive  effects  of ALMPs  solidly one would need
a general equilibrium model of transition economies  which goes beyond the task of
this paper. However, some of the distortive effects (substitution and dead-weight)
can in principal be analysed using an augmented  matching  model..
Public  employment (public  works)  measures might  serve  as  an  example to
demonstrate the distinction between general and partial equilibrium analysis of
ALMPs in transition economies.  When the stock of public employment  participants  is
large relative to the unemployed  this measure reduces the overall unemployment
rate by a noticeable amount as we have with de-registration  of public employment
schemes participants a one-to-one  reduction of the unemployment  register as long
as there are no substitution effects. The interesting question to ask is then how
costly is this reduction  of the unemployment  stock. To this purpose  one would need
a cost-benefit-analysis  which would also look at possible fiscal substitution effects.
The analysis would become more complex if  scheme participants "crowded out"
other job searchers after the end of the scheme but it would still be of a general
equilibrium type.
Public works participants  are normally  hired for a rather short period (in Poland e.g.
for up to 6 months). In a partial equilibrium  framework one would ask the following
question when evaluating public works schemes:  was the unemployed  enabled to
maintain  or increase  his/her human  capital through his/her perticipation  resulting in a
higher re-employment  probability  in a regular,  non-subsidised  job?'°
Given the data limitations, distortive effects of ALMPs in transition economies are
also empirically difficult to analyse. Nevertheless,  a general comment  about policy
design by the governments  of CEE countries might  be in order. These governments
have undergone a learning process resulting in the formulation of ALMPs which
clearly try to minimise distortive effects. While  it is always virtually impossible to
eliminate dead weight losses, the revised legislation in CEE countries shows the
great efforts that  have been made to  reduce substitution and fiscal substitution
effects.
The non-experimental evaluation of ALMPs taking place in a  partial equilibrium
framework is dominated  by two approaches
10A less ambitious aim of public works participation could be the strengthening  of labour market
attachment  by some of the unemployed.  To analyse  this question  one  would need  to look at LFS data
which include  statements about participation  in ALMPs.  Thus far such data are no! available.12
The  first  approach looks  at  earnings  of  persons and/or  their  re-employment
probabilities who have been on a ALMP scheme and  compares them with the
earnings/re-employment  probabilities of a "control group". Training measures e.g.
intended to raise the productivity  of participants  should be mirrored, ceteris paribus,
in higher wages relative to persons  with similar characteristics  who have not been
given training. This approach uses micro data and tries to ensure that unobservable
individual-specific determinants  of earnings are controlled for (cf. e.g. Ashenfelter
and  Card  (1985).  More generally, participation in  any  ALMP measure should
enhance human  capital relative  to non-participants  and should  express itself, ceteris
paribus, in higher re-employment  probabilities  than those who have not participated.
The second approach, known as "transition methodology"? 1 , uses in one application
flow  analysis of  administrative macro data to  establish the  overall effect of  a
measure  on outflows  from unemployment.  The idea behind this approach,  formulated
by  Haskel  and  Jackman (1988)  among others,  is  that  a  measure which  is
administered on  a  large scale  can only  be  considered effective if  there  is  a
statistically significant positive correlation between such a measure and outflows
from unemployment.  One of the strong points of such an approach is the ability in
principal to take account of dead weight loss and substitution  effects. For example,  if
we  model the  determination of  overall outflows from  unemployment, a  positive
impact of a measure  can be considered  its net effect after all distortions have been
accounted  for.
A very simple and general model of an outflow function might be presented to
heuristically demonstrate  how ALMPs  can be evaluated.
0 = f(xi;x2),fj  > 0,f  2  < Oor  Ž0.
Outflows from unemployment (0)  are determined by a  vector of  labour market
variables (x1) - the stocks of vacancies and unemployment  plus a time trend - and
possibly by some or all elements of a vector of ALMPs (x2), where f is a general
function. An  econometric test  of  the  effectiveness of  ALMPs consists then  in
establishing  whether elements  in vector x2 have some predictive  power. Such a test
is  especially sensible  if  the  application of  an  ALMP scheme does  not  entail
111n general the term "transition methodology"  refers to analyses of transitions between different
labour  market  states  using micro or macro data. Such analyses were undertaken in developed
market economies  since  the early seventies.13
automatic  de-registration  of the unemployed  participants. 1 2 For example,  the Restart
programme  in Britain does not mean that the unemployed  move  automatically  off the
register, so a positive correlation between the Restart measure and outflows from
unemployment  does  imply  that  the  programme has  improved  the  search
effectiveness of  some of  the  unemployed. In  the  Polish case  hirings of  the
unemployed into regular jobs will  be regressed on the  stock of vacancies and
unemployment and  the (lagged) stocks of  participants of retraining and further
training. In Poland persons entering a training scheme do not leave the register.
With a lagged training variable one can, therefore, test the  effect of training on
hirings  of  the  unemployed: after  having  participated  in  a  training  scheme
unemployed  individuals might find a regular  job more readily than those who have
not participated.  Using such estimates of outflow functions, based on aggregate
data, has the advantage that it allows the detection of additional net hirings after
substitution  and dead weight effects  concerning  the stock of unemployed  have been
accounted  for.
The  "working  horse"  giving  economic  content  to  models  of  outflows  from
unemployment  is the matching  function where in its simplest form unemployed  job
searchers  are matched  with vacant  jobs.  In this context  ALMPs  can be thought of as
measures which facilitate this matching process.  When ALMPs are added to the
stock  of  unemployment and  vacancies as  factors  potentially  determining job
matching  we speak of an "augmented  matching  function". Below, such a function is
used to evaluate  Further Training  and Retraining  in Poland.
As a second application of transition methodology,  "problem groups" in the labour
force are identified by Markovian  analysis  of flows between  the labour market states
employment  (E), unemployment  (U) and not-in-the-labour-force  (N). 1 3 On the basis
of LFS data transition probability matrices  (P) of the following type can be estimated
for specific groups of the labour  force:
12For  a critique  of applying  augmented  matching  functions  even  when  ALMP  participation  implies  de-
registration  see  Calmfors  (1994).
13The  assumption  that  movements  between  labour  market  states  are governed  by a Markov  process
implies  that the  transition  probabilities  depend  only  on the  state  currently  occupied.  Applications  of
Markovian  flow  analysis  to Western  labour  markets  are  Marston  (1976),  Toikka  (1976)  and  Clark  and
Summers  (1979,1982a,1982b),  among  others,  while  applications  to a labour  market  in transition  are
Abraham  and  Vodopivec  (1993),  Bellmann  et  al. (1995),  Gora  and  Lehmann  (1995),  Foley  (1995)  and
Steiner  and Kwiatkowski  (1995). The Markovian  assumption  can be considered  appropriate  for a
transition  economy  subject  to a sudden  structural  shock,  where  individual  work histories  will be of
lesser  importance.14
PEE  PEU  PEN
P =  PUE~ PUU  PUN
-PNE  PNU  PNN
where e.g. PEU denotes the transition probability of an individual who has been
employed at the beginning of period t-1 and who is unemployed  at the beginning of
period  t. Such matrices  give a richer picture of the labour  market situation of specific
groups than the computed inflows into and outflows from unemployment  ( (PEU +
PNU) and (PUE + PUN)  respectively  ) and the reported  unemployment  stocks.
2. Data availability  and quality
The  assessment of ALMPs in transition economies is  still in  its  infancy. Data
availability  and quality are quite limited  which renders  evaluation difficult. Across the
countries of interest  different data sets are available  to analyse  the effectiveness  of
ALMPs.
In Hungary  there have been some surveys  which allow to identify "problem groups"
and perform impact analysis on the retraining and public employment measures
using micro data. The unemployment  flow data from the available administrative
data, on  the  other hand cannot be used for  aggreqate impact analysis using
"transition methodology"  as the data  only include benefit recipients.
In  Poland  these  administrative  data  cover  all  individuals  who  register  as
unemployed, stocks and inflows of ALMP participants and the flow of unemployed
hired for "regular", i.e. non-subsidised  jobs as well as stock and flows of notified
vacancies.  The estimation  of augmented  matching  functions is, therefore,  possible in
the Polish case. The Polish LFS data, on the other hand, did not contain any data on
labour market policy participation in the past. To allow for the analysis of  Polish
ALMPs using micro data a supplementary  questionnaire  was added to the August
1994 survey containing mainly questions related to labour market policy (cf. G6ra
and Sztanderska  (1995)).  The data resulting  from this supplemeni  have now become
available and should  enable researchers  to evaluate  ALMPs in a transition economy
at a technical level comparable  to Western evaluation studies. For this paper the
impact analysis of Polish ALMPs is, however, confined to the  above mentioned
estimation of augmented matching functions and to the presentation of some raw
data from the supplementary  questionnaire.15
It has been thus far a difficult task to secure LFS data from the Czech Republic
which would allow impact analysis of ALMP at the micro-level while Burda and
Lubyova (1995) have  used regional macro-data to  estimate the  contribution of
ALMPs to outflows from unemployment. Their paper will be discussed,  however, in
the general Czech context within which ALMPs are embedded.  With a very low
unemployment  rate the most interesting question has to  be whether ALMPs are
mainly responsible  for this rate or whether  there are other powerful  determinants.
3. Evaluation  of ALMP for specific countries
3. 1. Hungary
3.1.1. Characterisation  of the unemployed  receivinq benefits
One of the best analyses of the insured unemployed in Hungary can be found in
Micklewright  and Nagy (1994). The following section is mainly based on their paper
but also uses some information  from Szeml6r (1994) and from the survey of benefit
exhaustees  performed  by Lazar and Szekely (1994).
The analysis provided by Micklewright  and Nagy is based on the cohort of people
flowing from employment into unemployment  insurance (Ul) receipt in March 1992,
giving approximately  40.000 spells. Only 40% of the stock of unemployed  is covered
by insurance as of August 1994. However,  the results of their analysis  are extremely
interesting insofar as even the most privileged unemployed  in Hungary, i.e. those
who receive benefits, have on average  a poor labour market experience  expressing
itself in relative to OECD levels very low outflow rates from unemployment  (Boeri,
1994 and Micklewright  and Nagy, op. cit., p. 10).
Micklewright and  Nagy essentially document inflow into and  outflow rates from
insured unemployed  disaggregated  by the elements of the following set: {sex, age,
education,  occupation (manual  or non-manual),  region). Their results are now briefly
presented  and discussed.
Inflow  rates into insured  unemployment
The  monthly  inflow  rates  estimated  by  Micklewright and  Nagy  are  roughly
comparable to  those of  most European OECD countries during recession and
definitely not high by OECD standards. More interesting than this result are the
presented  relative magnitudes  of the inflow rates calculated for the elements of the16
above mentioned set.  Hungary  is an exception in transition economies insofar as
the female unemployment  rate is lower than the rate for males. This is entirely due
to a lower inflow rate into unemployment  (0.80% versus 1.14%). This lower inflow
rate  can in turn  be explained to  a great degree by the  different occupational
structure of male and female employment,  with half of all females in non-manual  jobs
and only a quarter of all males in such  jobs. As manual  workers have on average an
inflow rate which is about 3.5 times larger than for non-manual  workers, more non-
manual  jobs for women implies  a lower female inflow rate into unemployment. 14
The  inflow rates disaggregated by age and education show expected patterns.
Younger groups tend to have higher inflow rates than older ones, a finding observed
in Western economies  as well as in transition economies.' 5 For women  the variation
by age is, however, not as strong as for men.  Educational  attainment and inflow
rates into unemployment  are inversely  related, with the special  finding that persons
with a vocational background have the same high inflow rate as persons with only
primary education. Vocational training before the regime switch seems  to have led
to  skills which are required less than other skill  groups as  the  implied higher
separation rate  indicates.  The  often stated notion that there  has been over-
investment in vocational education in Eastern Europe receives further confirmation
by  the  transition  probabilities of  the  Polish  labour  market disaggregated by
educational  attainment  which  are  presented  in  section  IV.3.2.1.16  Finally,
Micklewright and  Nagy show that  regional inflow and  unemployment rates are
strongly positively correlated  (correlation  coefficient  of 0.81). Besides  Budapest,  the
regions bordering Austria have the lowest unemployment  and inflow rates while
regions in the East of Hungary  have the highest unemployment  and inflow rates.
Outflow and hazard rates from insured  unemployment
Micklewright and  Nagy first  report the  exit  states for  spells of  unemployment
insurance (Ul) starting in March 1992.  Most importantly  the largest fraction of exits
from Ul occurs because of exhaustion of benefits (41.9% and 46% for  men and
women respectively). This hints at the large share of long-term  unemployed  among
140nce controlled  for occupational  status  the differences  by sex nearly  disappear;  manual  female
workers  have a monthly  inflow rate of 1.24%  (men 1.41%)  while non-manual  female workers  a
monthly  inflow  rate  of 0.36%  (men  0.38%).
15The  same  pattern  is observed  for eastern  Germany  in the period  1990-1991  by Bellmann  et al.
(1995)  and  for Poland  in the  period  1992-1994  by  G6ra  and  Lehmann  (1995).
161n Poland  the transition  probability  PEU  is for both men  and  women  with vocational  background
much  larger  than  for any  other  educational  group.17
the unemployed  as maximum  entitlement  periods  for benefit are 18 or 24 months  for
this cohort.  Those who have quit voluntarily have a larger fraction of exhaustees
than those who have been laid off (52.9% vs 42.6%).  The second largest fraction of
exits is into regular employment  (37% and 28.8% for men and women respectively)
while only 5.5% of the male cohort and 5.2% of the female cohort exit into one of the
ALMP measures. The largest measure  is training, with proportionately  more women
participating  than men (2.8% of all exits vs 2% of all exits). 1 7
The survivor functions for females and males, plotted by Micklewright and Nagy,
have the same slope for most spell lengths; only for very long spells does the
survivor function for females become  flatter than that for men.  For all spell lengths
the former function lies above the latter, however only slightly, thus pointing to
somewhat lower outflow rates from insured unemployment  for women.  As these
differences  are small, though, the much lower inflow rates into unemployment  cause
a  smaller  stock  of  female  unemployment.  However, once  unemployed, the
experience  of Hungarian  women is not very different  from the experience of women
in most other transition economies;  they have a lower re-employment  probability
than men, stay  longer in unemployment  and  have a  larger share of  long-term
unemployment  (cf. also Sz6mler,  op. cit.).
Using a "competing risks" model Micklewright and Nagy estimate the hazard rate
into each state separately. 1 8 Here, only the estimates of three hazards, to go to
regular employment, to go to training and to  go to  public works (the two most
important  ALMP measures),  are discussed.
For both men and women the probability of going to regular employment  increases
monotonically  with education.  With the default category being primary education
males with vocational education have a 36% higher hazard than the base hazard,
while males with university education have a  hazard which is 89% higher.  For
women we have a similar relationship  between  the hazards (an increase  of 16% for
vocational, an increase of  59% for  university education over the base hazard).
Higher age means roughly a lower probability of flowing into regular employment.
With  a base group of the 21-25 years aged, all  older groups have a lower re-
employment  probability. The age groups standing  before retirement (over 56 years
17The remaining  categories  of exit are disqualification  and normal  or early retirement.
18'The hazards of exit to different states are assumed  independent  and we estimate  this 'competing
risks model by successively  maximising  the likelihood  with respect  to the parameters  of the hazard  of
each state j while treating as censored all exits to states other than j."  (Micklewright  and Nagy, op.
cit.,p. 13)18
for men and between  51 and 55 years for women)  have only approximately  one tenth
of  the  re-employment probability  of  the  base  group.  Not  only  for  insured
unemployed  but also for exhaustees  are age and educational attainment powerful
predictors of flowing into employment  (cf. Lazar and Szekely,  op. cit., p. 8).  Boeri's
(1994) contention that individual characteristics  are not significant determinants  of
outflows from unemployment  is, therefore, not supported by the evidence of the
discussed  Hungarian  micro  data sets.
The estimated hazards to go to training for men and women seem to indicate a
wrong targeting of this ALMP measure.  Those people who have a relative higher
probability of flowing into regular employment,  i.e. the young and the well educated,
also have a relative higher probability of being taken onto a training scheme.  In
other words, those unemployed  who seemingly have the least difficulty finding re-
employment on their own are above all  targeted for  training measures.  That
Hungarian  employment  offices engage consciously  in "creaming  off' when targeting
training measures  will be discussed below. The estimated  hazards to go to public
works show for men an inverse  relationship  between  education and the probability of
entering the scheme. This might be a reflection of the type of work performed  by
men in this scheme or a  reflection of targeting the underprivileged among the
unemployed. Age is not a significant  determinant  in this instance. For women who
are much less likely to exit into public works education is not a significant predictor
of this hazard rate, while non-manual  occupation is.  That this latter covariate has
predictive power points to the often heard fact that municipal administrations use
unemployed women  in  clerical  and  health  care  related jobs  and  that  fiscal
substitution  effects are present in the application  of public  works.
3.1.2. Evaluation  of active labour  market policies
Hungary is the only transition economy  where "controlled experiments"  have been
undertaken to evaluate ALMPs.  In O'Leary (1994) we find such an experiment  to
evaluate  the Hungarian  retraining and public  works measures. There, the sample to
be evaluated consists of three sub-samples:  registered unemployed  who did not
participate in ALMPs, those who participated  in retraining in the second half of 1991
and those who participated in public service employment  (PSE) in September  1991.
This sample was interviewed  in November  1993.19  The impact analysis of ALMPs
looks above all at differences  in the re-employment  probabilities  and earnings of the
three sub-samples.  O'Leary uses various methods to  control for  differences in
19Strictly speaking, O'Leary's analysis is not a controlled experiment as he does not select persons
with the same observable  characteristics  and then assigns  them to the three groups. Instead he tries
to control for observable  characteristics  ex post.19
observable  and unobservable  characteristics  of the three subsamples. With respect
to differences in observable characteristics  O'Leary (op. cit.) states the following:
"Compared  to the sample of registered unemployed  those in the retraining sample
are significantly  younger, more likely to be female, more  educated, more specialised
in professional and technical skills, much more likely to have worked in white collar
jobs, less likely to have received Ul since June 1991, less likely to have special
problems in finding a job, and less likely to be unskilled.  [  .....  ]  Relative to the
registered  unemployed  PSE workers  tend to be somewhat  younger, more likely to be
male, less educated, less specialised  in either manual  or technical skills, much less
likely to have worked in white collar jobs, much less likely to have received Ul since
June 1991, more likely to have special problems in finding a job, and much more
likely to  be unskilled."  This  confirms the  results of  the  hazard rate  analysis
undertaken by Micklewright  and Nagy;  participants  of the retraining measure  are on
average much "better" than registered unemployed  who do not participate in an
ALMP measure,  while PSE participants  are a lot "worse".
There seems to be a conscious policy by the authorities to "cream off" the best
candidates among  the unemployed  for retraining courses  as the following quote from
an administrator  of a retraining centre shows. "Applicants  undergo an aptitude test
and  a health examination  [...]. With  courses  where there  are too  many applicants,
there is a kind of ranking based on the psychology tests results. [...] Recently an
attempt was made to encourage  training institutions to use specialists  to do deeper
examinations  to reduce dropouts among retraining  participants. In this field we are
extremely happy  about  the  methods used  by  the  regional retraining center."
(O'Leary, op. cit., p.  10f., emphasis added).  While  consciously targeting those
individuals  with  a  comparative advantage with  retraining  might  be  a  very
questionable practice, 20 even if  one accepted such targeting as appropriate the
success  of the retraining programme  still needs to be investigated. Persons  with the
more favourable characteristics  of the retraining participants might have far higher
re-employment  probabilities in a regular job than the average unemployed  even in
the absence  of the retraining programme.
20Conventional  wisdom, as e.g. expressed by Micklewright  and Nagy (op. cit., p. 17), would clearly
say that targeting the "best" among  the unemployed  for retraining  courses  is  a failed policy as these
individuals  would have the highest chances  of regaining  employment  anyway. Given the very weak
labour demand in most transformation economies  it is not obvious that targeting "problem groups"
among the unemployed for training would in fact increase the chances of such groups for regular
employment  at all.  Therefore,  targeting such groups  might be highly inefficient.20
The simplest  way to compare  labour market  outcomes,  in our case consisting  of re-
employment  probabilities and earnings,  is to look at the unadjusted  mean outcomes
of the treated group (i.e. the retraining participants) and the control group (i.e. the
unemployed  who never participated in an ALMP measure). If the selection of both
groups were entirely random, this would be the appropriate method to evaluate the
retraining measure.  O'Leary computes a re-employment  probability of retrainees
which is 19.2 percentage points higher than the one for the unemployed  without an
ALMP measure, with the difference being statistically significant at the 95% level.
The  also computed difference in  earnings (1  500 Forints) is  not  significant at
conventional  levels.  Once  he  controls  for  the  difference  in  observable
characteristics  of retrainees  and unemployed  without participation  in ALMPs much  of
the higher mean re-employment  probability of the retrainees disappears.  Using a
synthetic comparison group 2 1 the difference in the re-employment  rate falls to  1.2
percent which was not significant. Average monthly  earnings of the synthetic group
were, however, lower by 2 052 Forint pointing to the fact that the most productive
among the  registered unemployed had been chosen for  the training measures.
Using regression adjusted impact estimates  for retraining the difference in the re-
employment  probability falls to 6.4 percent with average higher earnings of those
retrainees in regular jobs of 500 Forint.  The latter difference was however not
statistically significant.  To take account of possible differences in unobservable
characteristics  of the retraining and comparison  groups O'Leary produces  selection
bias corrected impact  estimates  of the retraining programme. These estimates  give
a re-employment  probability  32 percentage  points higher  for the retrainees  with 23.5
percentage points due to observable characteristics  and 8.9 percentage points due
to selection bias.
Whatever  the  method  used  to  adjust  for  observable  and  unobservable
characteristics it seems clear from O'Leary's  analysis that the Hungarian retraining
programme  produces  larger re-employment  probabilities  and higher earnings for the
retrainees  than for the unemployed  not participating in an ALMP mainly because of
the observable  "better quality" of the former and because  of a strong selection  bias.
Sub-group  analysis  of  retraining  performed by  O'Leary  shows  that  "groups
considered to be the most difficult to re-employ  appear  to have gained the greatest
help in getting a normal  job by retraining,  these groups are: older workers, those  with
less education , and those without a manual trade." (O'Leary, op. cit., p. 18).  One
could imply from this result that targeting those with comparative  disadvantages  in
211t  is constructed by choosing with replacement  for each retrainee that person of the comparison
group  which has the closest  observable  characteristics.21
the labour market will  generate the largest gains.  As this  sub-group analysis
admittedly does not consider selection bias a plausible explanation of the quoted
result could be that given the vetting process only the most motivated among the
older and less educated  workers are chosen and that in these age and educational
groups motivation is a much more important determinant  of gaining re-employment
than among younger  and more  educated  workers.
Summarising  this section on the evaluation of Hungarian  retraining measures, the
"best" among the unemployed are targeted for this measure, once controlled for
observable and unobservable  characteristics  the greater chances of re-employment
of those who have completed  a retraining course compared  to the unemployed  who
have not participated in an ALMP diminish dramatically.  Members of  "problem
groups" among the unemployed  if taken on the retraining scheme have the highest
re-employment  probabilities. This result is achieved  without controlling for selection
bias. A possible inference  from this result  could be that "problem  groups" among  the
unemployed should be targeted and members  of these groups carefully vetted for
motivation, flexibility and intrinsic ability.  This combination  of targeting and vetting
might give the "biggest bang" for the expenditure  on retraining.
The evaluation of the Public Service Employment  (PSE) scheme tries to correct for
the mentioned sample selection, with the "worst" among the unemployed being
selected, using the same three approaches  that were discussed  in connection with
the retraining measure.  Unadjusted  impact estimates  give a lower re-employment
probability  for  PSE  participants of  16.4  percentage points  compared to  the
unemployed  who have not participated in an ALMP.  If one corrects for observable
and unobservable characteristics  this value is only slightly lowered; depending on
the method used the value ranges between 13.3 and 16 percentage points.  This
hardly changing re-employment  probability  whether controls are used or not can be
got because the duration of unemployment  is not a characteristic controlled for by
O'Leary and many of  the  PSE participants are from the  pool of  the  long-term
unemployed who  in the absence of an ALMP might have lower re-employment
probabilities because of  loss of  human capital, lower search efforts or  outright
discrimination  by employers. Clearly, participating in PSE seems to be ineffective
insofar as it does not rebuild human capital, boost search efforts or improve the
image  of the long-term  unemployed  individual. A second  explanation  for the virtually
constant re-employment  probability across the different methods of impact analysis
could be that participation  in the scheme is a negative  signal to the employer. From
OECD  countries negative  signalling problems  arising  from the participation  in certain
schemes  is a well known  fact.22
In  most  transformation economies programmes like  the  Hungarian PSE  are
conceived to mainly promote equity; those with long spells of relatively low income
are given access to employment  which temporarily  gives them higher income. 22 The
success of a programme  like PSE should, therefore, not necessarily be judged by
whether it enhances  the chance of regaining  regular employment. If, however, PSE
participation  generates  a negative  signal to prospective  employers,  thus lowering re-
employment  probabilities, equity gains have to be weighed against the efficiency
losses due to the programme.
Finally some results of the study by Frey (1993) are presented  in order to above all
discuss possible distortive effects of PSE. The main, very limited data base for this
study was generated by a survey of PSE contract employers  in two counties (Jasz-
Nagykun-Szolnok  and Tolna).
One major problem  of the implementation  of PSE is the conflict of interest between
the  labour  offices  and  prospective employers many  of  which  are  municipal
authorities. The latter would like to employ  capable and reliable workers chosen by
themselves  for long periods  of time while the labour offices are mainly interested in
placing temporarily into  these jobs  as  many people as  possible who  without
assistance  would have great difficulties in finding any  job.
Some of the local authorities  clearly see PSE as a tool to provide certain services to
their community  at lower costs or to provide  services  which they otherwise  would not
have provided at all.  In both cases  certain distortive effects  which are well known in
OECD countries when analysing public employment can be present.  From the
above mentioned  survey  of PSE contractors  the following emerged:
dead weight loss was a minor problem; only 2.5% of PSE workers performed jobs
which were actually permanent  jobs but had been renamed  as PSE  jobs.
Among the  contractors 12% substituted PSE workers for  their  own  municipal
workers.
Fiscal substitution  was a slightly larger problem, 15% of PSE contractors increased
their numbers  of PSE workers  while decreasing  the number  of their own employees.
22For a discussion  of the similar  Polish Public Works  programme see the next section.23
Displacement  of output effects  seemed  to be quite strong as local governments  often
wanted certain work done by their subsidised  PSE employees  which previously had
been given to outside private entrepreneurs. From the result of the survey one can
infer that  this  effect  has  an  upper  bound of  24%  of  work  done  by  private
entrepreneurs  in the absence  of the PSE programme.
Even though the  mentioned distortive effects are not very strong the fact that
virtually all possible such effects seem to occur points to a poor design of the PSE
programme which  in  addition, as previously discussed, does not  produce any
efficiency  gains.
3.2. Poland
3.2.1. The identification  of some "problem  groups"
As a first task one might  try to identify "problem  groups" in the Polish labour market
in general and among  the unemployed  in particular. The data used for this exercise
are the data from the PLFS. There are two major advantages using LFS data; the
picture one gets of the Polish labour market is richer than if one only used register
data and unemployment  is consistently defined along ILO-lines. The estimation of
transition probabilities is done separately  for men and women as the labour market
experiences  are quite different  for the two sexes (cf. e.g. Boeri, 1994, OECD, 1993,
and G6ra and Lehmann,  1992 and 1995).  After this partitioning of the sample the
data are further disaggregated  by education,  age, duration of unemployment  (for the
stock  of  male  and  female  unemployed) and  transition  probabilities are  then
estimated  for the various sub-groups. 23
Yearly  transition  probabilities  are  estimated  since,  with  the  relative  fine
disaggregation  of the data, quarterly flows (they can in principle be estimated) are
often too infrequent for some of the categories to arrive at statistically meaningful
estimates.  The estimation of yearly transition probabilities does not cause major
problems as far as flows out of employment  and from the not-in-the-labour-force
state  are  concerned.  However,  the  estimated  yearly  probabilities  out  of
unemployment  should be taken with caution as they are subject to downward bias
due  to  substantial round-tripping over  the  year.  The  PLFS  data  allow  the
construction of two yearly panels, May 1992 to May 1993 and May 1993 to May
23The important issue of regional diversification in the Polish labour market using Markovian flow
analysis  has been  investigated  by G6ra  and Lehmann  (1995). It will not be addressed  here.24
1994.  For the economy as a whole the differences in the entries of the transition
probability matrices for the two periods are not statistically significant (G6ra and
Lehmann,  1995). Without much  loss of generality  the period  May 1992 to May 1993,
when slightly  a  larger number of  transitions occurred, can be  chosen for  the
analysis.
Before discussing the transition probability estimates,  some stock variables of table
6, namely participation  and unemployment  rates as well as LTU shares for men and
women by age, will be briefly analysed  for the data points May 1992 and May 1993.
The different experience for men and women in the Polish labour market can be
seen by the unemployment  dynamics  and the May 1993 entries where with all age
groups unemployment  rates are higher for women  than for men and where for all but
one age group LTU shares are much  higher for women. A larger LTU share means,
of course, lower outflow rates from unemployment;  women have, therefore, less
opportunities  to regain employment  than men. In fact, job accession  rates which can
be computed  from transition probability matrices 24 (the sum of the flows UE and NE)
are with all age groups larger for men than for women.  The female LTU shares
would be reduced by  increased labour force exit of the  long-term unemployed
women. That women in Poland  do not exit the labour  force more than they enter it in
the reported period can be seen from the fact that women's  participation rates do not
decrease over time; with the exception  of one age category between  May 1992 and
May 1993 these rates stay constant or increase.  The age groups under 55 years of
age have participation  rates which are high relative to most OECD  countries, as long
as  women  have  similar  unemployment inflow  rates  like  men  and  lower
unemployment outflow rates these participation rates contribute to  higher female
unemployment  rates and LTU shares.
While the higher unemployment  incidence  among Polish  women is a well known fact
which has been discussed in extenso  the much higher unemployment  rate among
the young (< 25 years of age) for both genders needs further discussion.  At first
glance this age group seems to  be the "problem group" among the unemployed.
Compared  to the next three age groups its unemployment  rate is between 90% and
270% higher if we take all four data points into consideration. Using Polish register
data, Schmidt  (1994) has shown  that these differences  disappear  when participation
rates among the young are assumed  to be similar  to those in Sweden  and Germany.
Schmidt  moots  that because  of a large shadow  economy  in Poland  where especially
the young have gainful employment  opportunities  low participation  rates among  the
24These  matrices  are not presented  here but available upon  request.25
young reflect false reporting of being not in the labour force.  To  demonstrate
Schmidt's proposition and to  check its validity with LFS data a simple arithmetic
exercise will be undertaken. Let's take the example  of young males in May 1992,
where the unemployment rate of  this group is 23.1% and the participation rate
46.9%.  Let's have the (unrealistic) assumption  that in all age groups no person
among the identified unemployed  works in the shadow  economy. Assume  then that
the "true" participation rate among young males is 65%, the rates one finds in e.g.
Sweden and Germany  for this age group.  The difference between  46.9% and 65%
is then due to unreported employment  of the young in the shadow economy. Given
these assumptions,  the imputed "corrected" unemployment  rate for young males is
16.6% instead of 23.1%.  Under similar assumptions  a participation rate of 55% for
women implies, again for May 1992, a "corrected" unemployment  rate of 20.6%
instead of 30%.  When a percentage  of those employed in the shadow  economy is
falsely reported as unemployed  and this percentage  is constant  across age groups,
the gap between the unemployment  rates of the young and of other age groups
narrows  further.
This arithmetic  exercise is not meant  to find the "true" unemployment  rates for young
males and females. It is meant  to point to the dangers  of readily identifying  "problem
groups" and targeting labour market policies at  them.  In the  Polish case, the
participation rates of the young, very low in international  comparison, need to be
closely investigated. Alternatively  to employment  in the shadow  economy such low
rates could also imply that the young see opportunities  from education which are
greater in an economy  of transition  than in mature  Western economies. The validity
of this explanation of  low participation rates would mean that the unemployment
rates of the young were indeed as high as shown by the LFS data.
Whatever the reasons for the low participation  rates one should point out, however,
that even after the "correction"  of the unemployment  rates, the LFS data still produce
a higher incidence  of unemployment  for young males and females than for any other
age group in  Poland.  So these groups should be targeted anyway even if the
amount of targeting depends  crucially  on which of the two scenarios  is valid.
Men and women over 55 years but before retirement age have a relatively weak
labour market attachment  as their relatively low participation  rates show. Also, if we
ignore the groups above 65/60 years of age, their  job accession  rates are by far the
lowest among the age groups while their labour  force exit rates are at least twice as
high.  The relative values of both types of rates might hint at a discouraged  workers
effect which might be quite strong in transition economies and which artificially26
lowers the unemployment  rates of these age groups 25 (cf. Schmidt, op. cit.).  An
alternative explanation  for the in comparison  with OECD countries low participation
rates of older workers could lie in the difficult working  conditions of many production
workers before the regime switch. The "physical" capital of many of these workers
might have been used up more rapidly than of comparable workers in Western
economies where advanced technology makes work less physically strenuous.
When this  explanation is  valid, targeting ALMP measures at  older  workers is
certainly inefficient.
Research into the causes of relatively low participation rates of young and older
workers seems to  be an important prerequisite for  the formulation of  ALMP in
Poland.  Such research could establish whether these participation rates  are
genuine or whether the unemployment  rates of the young or older workers are
severely upward  or downward  biased.
The long-term unemployed  seem to be a "problem  group" that need to be targeted
as the high LTU shares in May 1993 for all age groups show.  Between  May 1992
and May 1993 the unemployment  rates are slightly falling for most age groups while
their LTU shares rise spectacularly. These dynamics  will come about by very low
overall outflow rates from unemployment  and relatively constant inflow rates into
unemployment.
The yearly transition probabilities out of  the state of  unemployment, shown by
duration of  unemployment for  men and women separately in table  7,  imply in
comparison with OECD countries very low outflow rates from unemployment. The
outflow rates are higher for men than for women, these higher rates are entirely
driven by larger male job accession rates as labour force exit rates are with the
exception of the last category substantially larger for women than for men.  Most
importantly, though, duration does  not seem to  be a  determinant of  either job
accessions or overall outflows from unemployment. While long-term unemployed
men do have a higher labour force exit rate than the other duration categories  they
also have larger job accessions  than the preceding duration category.  Long-term
unemployed  women, on the other hand, have the third highest job accession rate
and the lowest labour force exit rate.
251f  we take males in May 1992 and assume  that 20% of those reporting  to be outside  the labour force
are discouraged  workers who would be unemployed  if in the labour force, the unemployment  rate of
males between  55 and 64 years of age would shoot  up from 7.2%  to 22.4%!27
These results  should be  taken with  caution, though.  As  inflows  into  public
employment  and wage subsidy schemes are large relative to hirings 26 and as the
long-term unemployed are  specifically targeted for  these measures the  over-
representation  of the long-term  unemployed  among  participants  can lead to a strong
upward  bias of the job accession  rates for this latter group.
The estimated transition probabilities would imply little or no state dependence for
the pool of the unemployed. Below we will return to this issue when an augmented
matching function is estimated for  Poland.  Nevertheless,  whether there is state
dependence or  not, targeting the long-term unemployed with ALMPs in Poland
seems rather an equity than an efficiency issue. With an overall demand  for labour
which is very weak the long-term unemployed  should be targeted because some of
the scarce  resource employment  should  be redistributed  to those  who have suffered
from a long spell of relatively  low income..
The  last disaggregation of  the  LFS flow data that  will  be discussed concerns
education. Several  points can be made from the inspection  of tables 8 and 9 which
give labour market transition probabilities for men and women separately and of
table 10 which presents participation rates, unemployment  rates and LTU shares,
again for men and women  separately.
First, for men, if one ignores the elementary  and incomplete schooling categories
which have far lower participation  rates than the other categories,  education and the
level of unemployment  are inversely related.  For women this correlation is also
present but less strong.
Secondly, secondary general, but above all elementary and incomplete schooling
means a far  lower attachment to  the labour market than the  other educational
categories. In fact, the only two educational  categories  with decreasing  participation
rates for men and women are elementary and incomplete schooling.  These two
categories have  by  far  the  largest  labour force  exit  rates  from  the  state  of
employment  (the probability PEN), for both men and women while their inflow rates
into  unemployment (the  sum of  PEU and  PNU) are compared to  most  other
categories low.  The already weak labour market attachment  of the least qualified
groups seems to become even more marginal as transition occurs.  In the Polish
case, targeting ALMPs  at these two groups in order to strengthen  their labour market
attachment seems under the conditions of the transition, i.e. weak labour demand
26Between  May 1992  and May 1993  the ratio of public employment  and  wage  subsidy participants  to
hirings was  0.31.28
and  a  large pool  of  the  unemployed with  strong labour market attachment, a
misguided  policy.
Thirdly, a "problem group" easily identifiable are men and women with vocational
training. For all data points this educational  category  has the highest unemployment
rate with an above average participation  rate for men and a slightly below average
participation  rate for women if we only consider the first five most qualified groups.
The relative low job  accession rates and high inflow rates into unemployment  of
persons in the vocational category might be an indication of the fact that human
capital acquired by this group before the regime switch has depreciated relatively
faster than the human  capital of other educational  categories. Vocational training in
socialist economies has produced very narrow and inflexible work profiles many of
which are virtually useless under the new conditions.  Alternatively, educational
category which is not a good proxy for qualifications  might be a good indicator of
unobservable individual characteristics; persons with more education are  more
flexible and dynamic and have a better understanding  of how to adapt to the new
economic environment.  Whatever the  reasons behind the  bad  labour market
experience of persons with vocational education in Poland, they are a large group
among the  population with  strong  labour  market attachment and  should  be
consequently identified as one of the primary group at which ALMPs should be
targeted.  Whether  training  measures increase  this  group's  re-employment
probabilities and should, therefore,  be the chosen policy tool is, however, an open
question as there exists an abundant supply of people who are unemployed,  much
better prepared for further training and retraining courses and have more desirable
characteristics  as far as prospective  employers  are concerned.
Finally, LTU shares  are not a function of  education.  Yearly oufflow rates from
unemployment are uniformly low in international comparison and result in large
shares of LTU no matter what the educational  category. This is further evidence of
very weak labour demand  generating  a stagnant  pool of unemployment  in Poland.
3.2.2. Analysis of raw data of supplement  to August 1994 PLFS on labour market
policies
The supplement on  labour market policies added to  the PLFS in August 1994
produced the first  data set  in Poland as far  as  active labour market policies
participants are concerned.  In future, questions of how or whether participation
determines higher earnings or re-employment  probabilities  can be investigated with29
this data set by rnatching labour market outcomes with the characteristics of the
individuals. For the time being, we just look at some outcomes and the frequency
distributions of the given answers to get a hunch about the effectiveness of the
various ALMP measures.  Besides loans to  start a business, intervention works
(wage subsidies), public works and training measures for the unemployed,  the job
brokerage function of labour offices is also discussed.  To generate the largest
possible numbers of ALMP participants individuals who have been registered as
unemployed  in a labour office at least once between  January 1990 and August 1994
were asked whether they at any time after January 1990 had been or were involved
in a scheme. In some instances  this makes  inferences  more  difficult. 27
Loans to start a business
Of those individuals  who identified  themselves  as having  registered  at a labour office
at least once between  January 1990 and August 1994, 3.3.% had asked at any time
after January 1990  for a start-up loan.  Successful  with their application  were in turn
24.2%.  Roughly 60% of those acquiring the loan had created a work place for
themselves  which still existed during the surveyed  week, 31% had created such a
work place, but it no longer existed  while only 10% were unable to use the money for
establishing  work for themselves. Given the data, one evaluation  criterion that can
be used is the duration of a thus created work place.  The mean duration of the
observed completed spells of scheme participants is 20 months. The government
has set 24 months as the lower limit beyond which only 50% of the loan has to be
repaid.  The average duration of all spells in the sample should be longer than 20
months and could be quite a lot longer as the sub-sample of the completed  spells
gives the sub-sample of all those who have "failed" in their business activities. 28.
Labour offices seem, therefore, to  have been successful in their vetting of loan
applications. Since there are probably only small displacement  of output effects the
quite impressive  duration  figures seem  to indicate  that start-up loans are a relatively
efficient ALMP measure in Poland and maybe should be extended.  One question
which certainly still needs to be investigated is whether dead weight losses occur
with the application  of this measure. This is left to later work.
27The  below presented  results  are not always  statistically  representative,  though. They are  just meant
to give us a hunch  about developments  of Polish  ALMPs.
281n our sample 18 out of 57 self-employed  work places have been terminated.  With  18 loans
granted in 1990 in our sample, and assuming  that some of the failures have occurred in subsequent
years,  this must mean that some of the in 1990  created  businesses  still existed in August 1994.30
The previously often heard criticism that these loans entailed amounts not sufficient
to set up a business (cf. e.g. Lehmann,  1992) does not seem  to be borne out by the
data and is, furthermore,  only voiced by 11  % of those unemployed  who did not apply
for a loan. A majority  of those not applying for a loan said that they were not able to
run their own business (39%) or that they did not know about the existence of the
scheme (20%).
In summary,  only a very small minority of the unemployed  applied for a start-up loan,
the loan applications seem to  have been vetted relatively well  as the average
duration of a thus created business  most likely has been in excess  of two years.
Intervention  Works (Wage Subsidies)
Approximately  9% of those having registered  at a labour  office at some  point in time
were offered a slot on the intervention  works scheme. Nearly one third (32%) of the
then unemployed  to whom these offers had been made rejected them.  To shed
some light on this relatively large number  one would need to link this outcome  with
the characteristics of the  person (demographic  and  educational characteristics,
duration  of unemployment,  benefit status). Here,  one can just look at the reasons  for
the end of the work on the scheme. Of those who entered the scheme but are no
longer working in the scheme 12.2.% have found regular employment  in the same
firm which is certainly not a negligible portion of participants. The vast majority of
those not  kept  on  (85%)  left  the  firm  because the  foreseen period  of  their
intervention works  job had ended.  Most firms clearly take the subsidy and release
subsidised labour once the  subsidy ends.  Furthermore, there is  some casual
evidence that substitution effects occur and that, especially in the health sector at
the municipal level, fiscal substitution effects are also common place.  The timely
ending of most intervention  works  jobs indicates,  on the other hand, that dead weight
loss is not a major problem.
Of course, from the given data we do not know how many found employment in
regular jobs in other firms after the period of the wage subsidy ended. However,
those not staying on in the same  firm in their large majority  (60%) do not believe that
participating in intervention  works increases  their re-employment  probabilities in the
regular labour market. This can be taken as evidence that for most workers on the
scheme participation does not enhance their human capital and that they  have
difficulty  finding regular employment.31
Public  Works
Since public works only started in 1992 the number of unemployed  in the August
sample who had been offered  a public  works slot is very small, namely 2%. Most of
these slots are in the state sector at the municipal level.  44% rejected this offer; of
those who had accepted and already finished their work within the scheme, 8.5%
stayed on in the same firm in another capacity. Most people, however, left the firm
when the public works they were assigned to were finished. Nearly 65% of these
people think that participation  in public works has not increased  their re-employment
probabilities (65%), while 24% did not know.  The public works scheme probably
prepares the unernployed  the least for regular employment. This does not mean,  of
course, that the benefits of this measure  do not outweigh  the costs. One can think of
this measure  as irnproving  equity as some of the long-term  unemployed  gain access
to employment  which increases  their income at least temporarily. Even when long-
term unemployed,  who do not receive  any longer unemployment  benefits,  are put on
the scheme, as long as the value added of public works production exceeds the
difference of the wage and the income  support  which has to be paid to the long-term
unemployed this measure is also more efficient than paying only income support.
When public works concentrate on enlarging and improving the infrastructure the
social value added might in fact be quite large.
Further  Training and Re-training  measures
Inspection of  the raw data allows only a very limited evaluation of the training
measures  that unemployed  people have been offered in Poland. One statistic to be
looked at is the mean duration of such measures.  By comparing it to the mean
duration of training of all in the sample one might get a hunch about the quality of
training measures  for the unemployed.
Approximately  6% of those having registered  at a labour  office had at any time been
offered a training course by their labour office.  The fraction of those rejecting this
offer is large, 45%.  Most of the undertaken training courses are paid for  by the
labour offices (92%).  The mean duration of the completed  courses is 10.5 weeks,
compared  to 16 5 for all in the sample  who take part in further training and retraining
courses.  If length is an indicator of quality, on average training courses for the
unemployed seem to  be of  a  lesser quality.  Unemployed participants in such
courses evaluate them, however,  rather positively  as 51% of them believe that their
re-employment  probabilities have a little bit improved  and 13% of them believe that
these probabilities have improved a lot.  So, at least as far as the unemployed32
participants themselves are concerned, training measures are valued much more
than the previously discussed measures of direct job creation.  Whether this is an
expression of wishful thinking or not can only be established by linking individual
characteristics  with training participation on one hand and with outcomes, i.e. labour
market status and earnings, on the other hand.  Only after one has controlled for
observable individual characteristics and, additionally, for selection bias, can one
see whether training participation has indeed increased re-employment  probabilities.
In the Polish case, this is left to later work.
Job brokerage
The raw data of the supplement  also allow us to say something  about the placement
activities of labour offices.  Of those in the August 1994 sample who entered into a
new relationship with an employer 6.6% found their last job through a labour office.
The majority found a job through personal contacts - i.e. through family and friends -
(30.7%), through professional contacts (8.5%), through a direct application to the
firm (18%) or through an announcement  of an employer (8%).  Thus, labour offices
seem to be a marginal contributor to job brokerage in Poland as far as the national
average is concerned. 29 With respect  to the unemployed,  only 8% were ever offered
a job placement in the regular labour market. Of the offered job slots 47% were not
taken up by the unemployed. That there are serious problems  with the brokerage
function of labour offices can be seen from the reasons  given for not having taken up
the offered job.  More than a quarter of the job offers had already been filled when
the applicants arrived at the firm (26%). In 14% of the cases the employer  asked for
qualifications which the  applicant did not  have, while  in 13% of the  cases the
employer did not want to hire the applicant outright.  The probably low quality of
many of these job offers might be inferred from the fact that among those who took
up the offered job but at the time of the interview had already terminated this work,
33% quit voluntarily.
3.2.3. Evaluation of Further Training and Re-training: Estimation of an augmented
matching  function
To  evaluate  Polish  training  measures  econometrically an  augmented  hiring
(matching)  function is estimated using pooled times series cross section (voivodship-
level) data. To this purpose several building blocks are needed (cf. Jackman and
Haskel, 1988 and Lehmann, 1993b).
29The employment offices set up by the trade unions have an even more dismal record.  Only 0.2%
of all jobs were brokered by these offices in our sample!33
As hirings in the Polish administrative  data only include unemployed  persons flowing
into regular, non-subsidised  jobs, this variable is orthogonal to ALMPs like public
works or wage subsidies. With  participation in a public works or wage subsidy
scheme  an  unemployed  is  automatically  de-registered,  i.e.  flowing  out  of
unemployment.  Regressing these ALMP measures on hirings one might pick up
some spill-over effects which occurr from ALMPs to regular hirings.  One cannot,
however, establish whether these ALMPs have improved the participants' ability to
search for a regular job.  The situation is different with the Polish Further Training
and  Re-training scheme.  Participants of  a  Polish training measure receive an
allowance which is slightly higher than benefit, they do stay on the unemployment
reaister, though.  Choosing  the stock of training participants, lagged appropriately,
as a regressor the question can be evaluated whether an increase in the stock of
training participants has a positive net effect on the hirings of the unemployed.  A
positive  net  effect  would  mean  that  some  of  the  unemployed through  their
participation in a training scheme have become more effective in their search for a
regular job  and that  substitution of non-participants by participants in the  hiring
process is not a 100%.
To test whether the search effectiveness of some of the unemployed has been
enhanced by being on a training scheme,  the following augmented  matching  function
is derived.  Let c be an index of the search effectiveness of the unemployed in the
absence of search enhancing labour market schemes  which takes a value between  0
and 1. Let
r=c(l+aM),  with
M =  77flE1, and ZIA  (1).
M  is  here  the  weighted  sum  of  search  enhancing employment measures  Ei
(i=1  ....,n), while t  is the search effectiveness  index which is impacted by such labour
market measures.  In the case of Polish training measures a. is assumed to be > 0.
Enhancing the  search  effectiveness of  some of  the  unemployed and  having a
substitution effect which is less than 100% would imply a positive a(.  Let H be the
number of unemployed  being hired in regular, non-subsidised  jobs, measured  during
a  certain  period, U  and  V  the  stock of  registered unemployed and  of  notified
vacancies respectively, both measured at the beginning of the period as are the
search enhancing employment  measures Ei  Then (WU)  is the search effective stock34
of the unemployed 30 and the augmented hiring function can be written down as
follows:
H=f(V,rU),f1,f2>0.  (2)
A general Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed as we do not want to impose
any priors about the returns to  scale properties of  hiring functions in transition
economies even though most of the evidence hints at decreasing returns to scale
(cf. Boeri,  1994).  Log-linearizing  this last equation and adding a constant term we
get
InH=  Inyo+vylInV+Y21In(rU)  (3)
For small values of caM  the equation becomes 3 1
InH~z-5o+t5ilnV+821nU+521nc+S3M,  whereS53=a72.  (4)
In the Polish case we can only consider one search enhancing ALMP measure,
Further Training and  Re-training.  From the  supplement one  can infer that the
average length of a completed  training spell for the unemployed  is between  2 and 3
months.  In the regression the stock of training participants, lagged one quarter, is
taken as the training measure  whose effectiveness  on regular hirings is investigated.
In principal then,  Polish training measures can be evaluated by performing the
following regression:
InH=5o+3llnV+62(lnU+Inc)+S3TR+e  (5)
where TR is the stock of participants in Further Training and Re-training divided by
100 and E is a white noise error term.
The duration structure of unemployment  given by Polish administrative  sources does
not lend itself to the construction  of the search effectiveness  index c, as it was done
for Britain e.g. in Layard et al. (1991) and in Lehmann (1993a).  In order to find a
30A detailed  discussion  of the concept  of search  effective  unemployment  can be found in Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991). In order  to be a meaningful concept  t  must also take values between 0
and 1.
31Note that In(LU)=lnU+lnt.  But In=In[c(1+aM)]. As for small x we have the rule ln(1+x)zx, ln[c(1+x
M)] zln c + aM.35
meaningful  proxy for the search effectiveness  index c, its function in an equation like
(5) needs to be briefly discussed.  Recall that c takes on values between 0 and 1,
the  lower this value the less efficient becomes the  stock of  unemployed in the
matching process. Note that in equation (5) the lower c, the more is subtracted  from
In U.  The value of c in turn is a function of the duration structure of unemployment:
the larger the proportions of longer duration categories in the unemployment pool
the smaller is the value of c. Essentially one can think of the search effectiveness
index  c  as  an  index which  tracks  the  duration  composition of  the  stock  of
unemployment  over time. 32 A very simple way to track this composition over time is
to  split the  pool of  unemployed into short-term and  long-term unemployed, i.e.
unemployed with an uninterrupted duration of less and more than twelve months
respectively. This can be done with the Polish data. The regression then becomes
(for the precise derivation of this type of equation,  see Boeri, 1994):
In H =So +  S,  In V + 62 In UsT + 63 In ULT  +  S4 TR±+  65 (In UsT-In  ULT) 2 + 6  (6)
where  UST and  ULT  are  the short-term  and  long-term  stocks  of unemployment.
Table 11 shows estimates  of an augmented  matching  function using equation (6) for
males and females jointly, covering six quarters form January 1993 to June 1994
and  using pooled cross  section time series  data of  the 49  voivodships.  This
regression has an exploratory character.  Further work  is required before  safe
conclusions can be drawn from this  type of  empirical evidence. Employing the
Scarpetta-Huber  taxonomy of Polish regions (cf. Gora and Lehmann,  1995) dummies
are included to control for region-specific  fixed effects 33 as well as time dummies  to
control  for  the  time varying macroeconomic environment that  is  common to  all
voivodships.  The coefficients on the dummies are not shown; however, while the
region-specific fixed effects were  not significant the time  dummies were  highly
32The search  effectiveness  index  c is constructed  in the following  way.  Assume  that there are D
duration  categories  in the stock of registered  unemployed.  Let  fd  be the outflow  rate of duration
category  d (d=1,....,D)  in a certain  steady  state  where,  as observed  in most  OECD  countries,  +1  >  +2  >
- > 4D  for all d (d=1,....,D), i.e. the shorter the duration category  the larger the steady state outflow
rate from unemployment. Also, let at the beginning  of time interval t wd.t  = Ud / Ut for all d (d=1,...,D)
where  Ud.t is the stock  of unemployment  duration  d and  Ut is the  total stock  of unemployment.  Then
Ct =  Ed Wdt  fd  so that  the search  effectiveness  index  c, can be indeed  thought  of an index  which
tracks  the  duration  composition  of  the stock  of unemployed  over  time.
33There  are six  types  of Polish  regions  enumerated  by Scarpetta  and  Huber:  agricultural,  developed;
agricultural,  others; heavily industrialized,  developed;  heavily industrialized,  others; diversified,
developed  and diversified,  others. By having  dummies  for the regional  type rather  than for each
voivodship  one reduces  endogeneity  problems  which  can arise  from the fact that some  voivodships
respond  to high  unemployment  (low  hirings)  by increasing  the  stocks  of ALMP  participants.36
significant. Thus the stocks of unemployment  and vacancies seem to capture most
of the variation across voivodship  types but not the variation over time.
Even though the regression is exploratory, the result has some credence as the
coefficient estimates on vacancies, short-term and long-term unemployment  are of
the same order of magnitude as the estimates of Boeri (1994) who estimated a
Polish matching function for the time period January 1992 to  March 1993.  The
estimates imply that  an increase in the number of short-term unemployed has a
much  larger  effect  on  hirings  than  an  increase  in  the  number of  long-term
unemployed.  Thus  the  two  pools are  not perfect substitutes in the  matching
process. 34 The  strongly  diverging elasticities also  indicate that  the  previously
presented estimates of job accession rates which were conditioned on duration of
unemployment (cf. pp. 26-27) could be seriously biased.  Like in OECD countries
outflows from  unemployment into  employment seem to  fall  drammatically with
duration of unemployment.
The  most important result is the  insignificance of the coefficient on the training
variable. This result can be interpreted  that after having ended a training course an
unemployed  person has not increased his/her effectiveness  in search of a job, it can,
however, also be interpreted that training participants among the unemployed have
increased their search effectiveness but have, in the hiring process, then "crowded
out" non-participants  among the unemployed. While the results of this regression do
not allow to discriminate between the two scenarios they do seem to imply that an
increase in the (lagged) stock of training participants  does not push up the flow from
unemployment  into regular employment. Whether Polish training courses have a too
small element which enhances human capital or whether unemployed who have
decisively enhanced their human capital just "jump the waiting queue" of  those
searching for a job 35 the overall net effect of Further Training and Re-Training on
hirings seems  to be zero.
The  labour force  survey evidence presented by  G6ra, Socha and  Sztanderska
(1995) on the relative magnitude of labour market transition probabilities of training
participants cannot be sensibly used to check our result.  They establish that the
34This statement  is equivalent  to the introduction  of the search effectiveness  index c  into the
matching  function.  Because long-term  unemployed  are not perfect substitutes  for short-term
unemployed  when  it comes  to hires  the search  effectiveness  of the stock  of unemployment  falls as
the proportion  of long-term  unemployed  rises  in the total stock. For a thorough  discussion  of the
reasons  why  long-term  unemployed  are 'worse"  job searchers  see e.g.  Layard,  Nickell  and  Jackman
(1991).
350f course,  a combination  of both  is most  likely.37
unconditional job accession rates for training participants,  although lower than those
of the total pool of the unemployed,  are higher than the rates for participants in other
ALMPs.  This just says that individuals targeted for ALMPs have a higher incidence
of  belonging to  problem groups than  individuals from  the  general  pool  of  the
unemployed. It also seems to say that those targeted for training measures are the
best among ALMP participants. It does not say anything about the effectiveness of
Polish  training  measures as  the  authors  do  not  control  for  observable and
unobservable characteristics.
3.3. The Czech Republic36
Unemployment  in what is after the Velvet Revolution the Czech Republic (CR) has
remained well below 5%. This unemployment  rate is not only one of the lowest in the
former communist countries, but also in the world. Many potential explanations of
this phenomenon are discussed in the literature, but it  has not yet been clearly
determined what actually has kept unemployment so  moderate in the  CR. The
explanation certainly lies in a combination of factors that are specific to the Czech
economic situation before the beginning of the transformation process, and to the
process of transformation itself. It is our aim to embed  the analysis of Czech ALMPs
into the general discussion of the performance  of the Czech labour market.
Considering the flow approach to labour markets, the unemployment  rate is a result
of inflow into unemployment, oufflow out of unemployment and oufflow out of the
labour force. The factors that explain these three flows also explain the  level of
unemployment.  The  following  exposition  of  reasons  for  the  low  Czech
unemployment  rate is therefore structured  around  these three flows.
3.3.1 General macroeconomic  performance  in the Czech Republic
Before beginning with the description of the Czech labour market it should be noted
that the general macroeconomic  situation of the CR is relatively favourable. Many of
the below quoted figures can be found in table 12.
The CR has had good initial conditions: it is a small, relatively open economy and,
unlike Slovakia, Poland or Hungary, it has long common borders with Austria and
Germany, two of  the  most advanced economies in the world. The  level of  net
36This  section  is  partially  based  on  preliminary  results  from  the  research  project  Czech
Unemployment  and German Labour Demand which the author is undertaking  jointly with Donata
Hoesch and Mark Schaffer.38
external debt of the CR in 1990  was low to begin with (3.5 billion US Dollars in 1990,
and 2.7 billion US Dollar in 1993) and has even fallen in 1993. In the same year the
net debt-export  ratio was 19 compared  to 269 in Poland  and 151 in Hungary.
At the end of 1990, at the outset of economic reforms, the Koruna was devalued
sharply to increase the competitiveness  of Czech products in world markets. Even if
the gains in competitiveness  were eroded by the middle of 1993, due to inflation and
the nominal pegging of the Koruna to  a basket of the US Dollar (35%) and the
Deutsche Mark (65%) in May 1993, the  current account remains positive (IMF,
1994).  Exports have grown at double digit rates since 1990, and imports have also
grown steadily.  Like other Central European economies, the CR has managed to
reorient  its  trade  away  from  CMEA toward  western  markets, despite  a  real
appreciation of the exchange rate.  The single largest trading partner in imports and
in exports is Germany  with a share of more than 30% of total trade.
The CR has also been quite successful as far as the fight against inflation and the
maintaining of a balanced budget are concerned.  Inflation almost reached 60% in
1991, but has then been between 10 and 20%. The general government balance
was positive at 1.4% of GDP. This suggests that since the beginning of the reforms
the economy  has been stabilised using restrictive  monetary  and fiscal policies.
Competitiveness of Czech products has also been enhanced by low real wages.
Since the beginning of reforms  wage growth has been restraint through a lax-based
incomes policy, with a short interruption of wage regulations from January to July
1993 (IMF, op. cit., pp. 9 and 93). Real wages and real product wages have stayed
low throughout the transition.
The favourable general macroeconomic  situation affects the labour market in so far
as the combination of relative stability and low labour costs attracts foreign capital
and strengthens the demand for Czech goods and services, which may in turn also
encourage private  sector development. However, one  might doubt  whether low
unemployment in the CR can be explained entirely by successful macroeconomic
stabilisation policies as some Czech economists  put forward (N.N., 1994).
3.3.2 The Czech labour market: inflow into unemployment  from employment
According to Boeri (1994) average monthly inflow rate into unemployment in 1992
was 0.5% of the employed. This inflow rate is slightly lower than that of Slovakia39
(0.8%) but in general in line with other CEE countries. All of these countries have
relative low inflow rates by western European standards.
The  slow  pace  of  restructuring could  be  one  explanation for  the  low  Czech
unemployment  rate.  It has been argued  that the Czech state sector and former state
sector are slow to restructure so that inefficient labour hoarding of a considerable
amount is still taking  place.  Because the government and enterprise managers
might want to avoid social conflict in order to protect their own future employment
could be protected. This policy might not be too costly because  unit labour costs are
low due to weak trade unions combined with tight wage controls at the enterprise
level and the devaluation of the Koruna.  Hence labour hoarding can be financed
without  too  much difficulty by  selling  stock and  equipment, or  by  using funds
earmarked initially for  investment.  On the other hand, it  is  argued that  labour
shedding could also be slower than expected, because large enterprises  do not face
a hard budget constraint yet. Substantial  amounts  of state subsidies,  tax arrears and
inter-enterprise trade credit help to postpone bankruptcies. In addition, it is argued
that even after the first wave of privatisation small share holders and investment
funds are not able to force management  to restructure.
Two issues need to be addressed when discussing restructuring in the CR.  First, it
should be investigated whether restructuring  and labour shedding is in fact as slow
as often claimed.  A contrary position is taken by Raiser (1994) who argues that
restructuring in the CR has actually been quite substantial.  Secondly, one should
ask what can be considered an efficient speed of restructuring in the presence of the
above mentioned market failures and government  interventions.
When discussing the inefficiency of slow restructuring one should take account of
theoretical  arguments that  support  not  too  rapid  labour  shedding  in  certain
circumstances. Aghion and Blanchard (1993) and Burda (1993) find that massive
increases in unemployment  due to rapid inflow can harm  the transformation  process,
because high unemployment creates social costs that exceed the private costs of
unemployment. If marginal social costs of  unemployment are rising, for  instance
because during prolonged unemployment human capital depreciates or  because
high  unemployment may hamper the  development of  the  private  sector due to
resulting  larger contributions and thus higher wage costs, it is not optimal to create
a too large pool of unemployed.
Relative large subsidies to enterprises and inter-enterprise debt could be further
explanations for low inflows into unemployment:  Although subsidies to enterprises40
are not directly intended as employment  policies, their potentially positive effect on
employment  cannot be ignored. Even if it is impossible  to assess how many jobs are
exactly saved by these policies, it  seems clear that as  a consequence of  such
policies restructuring in the Czech Republic  has not been as vibrant as it would have
been in their absence.  Large enterprises  still seem to hoard labour as employment
there has fallen by far less than industrial production and the average number of
hours worked has declined more than employment  in these firms in the years 1990
through 1993 (cf. table 12).  Contributing  to this are certainly low real wages as well
as low real product wages in industry relative to Poland and Hungary for instance
(cf.  OECD,  1995).  Nevertheless, enterprises in  the  Czech  Republic are  still
marginally more subsidised by the government than in other leading transforming
economies. Producer subsidies have amounted  to almost 40 billion of Koruna each
year since 1991, and for 1994 the same  amount is projected.  This is a share of GDP
of between  4% to 5%, falling in real terms, however. In 1992, 3.2% of the Hungarian
GDP and only 0.5% of the Polish GDP were spent on producer subsidies.
In  the  Czech  Republic  35%  of  the  producer subsidies  are  paid  out  in  the
transportation sector, 20%  in  agriculture and  in foodstuffs.  Also important are
residential heating and mining with 14% respectively.  So, producer subsidies are
concentrated in a few sectors considered politically strategic by the government.
However, in addition to subsidies, loans for environmental projects, infrastructure
and export promotion guaranteed by the government have risen significantly from
about 20 billion of Koruna at the end of 1992 to about 80 billions of Koruna in May
1994, even if only 10% of these guarantees are expected to be called on, which
amounts to less than 1  % of GDP. Moreover, distressed  firms can usually negotiate
tax arrears and thus be protected  from illiquidity. Enterprises  also protect each other
from  the  hard  budget  constraint by  using trade  credits more extensively than
elsewhere. In 1991, total receivables of the enterprise sector amounted to about
60% of GDP in the Czech Republic, whereas in Poland and Hungary they totalled
only  about  30%  of  GDP.  All the  above described policies soften the  budget
constraint of Czech enterprises, counteracting rather restrictive fiscal and monetary
policies and leading to slower than expected restructuring of the economy.  Thus
inflow  into  unemployment is  kept  under  control.  Whether  this  is  entirely
unintentional is certainly questionable.
Another factor that keeps inflow into unemployment  low may be considerable job to
job flows in the CR. Workers may pass from the restructuring  sector into the private
growing sector without passing through a period of  search unemployment, if  the
private sector is  growing quickly (see discussion of  private sector development41
below). In  1991 for  instance, 24% of  laid  off people found  a  new job  without
registering  as  unemployed.  Moonlighting  in  the  service  sector,  that  existed
extensively before transformation,  may just be transformed  into a legal or semi-legal
small business, if the credit constraint is surmountable.  If the new activity of a job
leaver is illegal (e.g. working abroad),  the worker may officially leave the labour force
altogether (see discussion below).
A further factor which might explain smaller inflows into unemployment relative to
other transition economies is  the small share of  agricultural employment in the
Czech  Republic  at  the  beginning  of  the  reforms.  In  transition  economies
unemployment  rates are higher in rural than in urban areas. One explanation  for this
could be larger restructuring needs of the agricultural sector implying more labour
shedding and  larger  inflows into unemployment in  rural  areas.  Because of  a
relatively low share of agricultural employment  the Czech Republic might then have
lower inflows into unemployment  than other transition economies  (OECD, 1995).
3.3.3 The Czech labour market:  outflow out of unemployment  into employment
Also according to Boeri (1994) average monthly outflow rate out of unemployment  in
1992 was 24.8%. That is the highest outflow rate in CEE countries. By western
European standards  this is also a high outflow rate.
It is generally believed that the private sector in the CR is more dynamic than in
other CEE countries and that it its activity is underestimated  by the official statistics
(Ham et al., 1993 and Benacek, 1994).  In almost all transforming  economies in the
region demand for services was unsatisfied  or satisfied by moonlighting, so that the
opportunities for  small enterprises in  this sector are ample. But most  probably
potential entrepreneurs in all  CEE have considerable difficulties to  acquire the
capital necessary for a start.  In the CR, however, real wages are relatively low,
which  contributes to  private  sector development.  First it  makes any  kind  of
enterprise less costly and thus lowers the barrier to entry due to lack of capital.  It
also makes  tourism, a sector booming  tremendously  in the CR, even more attractive.
Secondly, it  attracts foreign  firms  to  set  up  new enterprises in  the  CR  or  to
subcontract with Czech firms.  Thirdly, low wages turn to be privatised firms into
more lucrative deals, while too  high real  producer wages might cause the  net
present value of many to be privatised  firms to be negative (cf. Akerlof et al., 1991).
Another, more general reason for the more dynamic private sector growth in the42
Czech  Republic  could  be  the  higher  state  of  urbanisation which  the  above
mentioned low share of agricultural employment  implies.
One explanation  of relative large outflows from unemployment  into employment  thus
far not much studied is the closeness  of the Bavarian and Austrian economies which
might boost private firm formation on Czech territory through demand  for relatively
skilled,  but  low  cost  labour.  It  might  be  worthwhile  to  investigate whether
subcontracted and home production for  the  Bavarian and Austrian markets has
boosted private firm formation in border regions. 37 Table  13 shows the stock of
small private firms by region in April 1994 and the regional unemployment rates of
September 1994. The regions "Austria", "Bavaria"  and "EX-GDR"  are the districts in
the CR bordering at these regions.  From the static figures in table 13 we cannot
make out a larger incidence of private entrepreneurs in the regions bordering at
Austria and Bavaria.  The statistic "Frequency/regional LF" is uniform across all
regions with the exception of Prague where it is higher by 46%.  The much lower
unemployment rate in the region bordering at Bavaria does not seem to be caused
by flows into small production on Czech territory as we surmised.  Svejnar, Terrell
and  Munich  (1995)  estimate a  model  of  the  determination of  outflows  from
unemployment for  the Czech Republic.  Their results lend some support to  our
conclusion: their measure of geographic  proximity to Bavaria,  the log of the distance
to the Czech-German  border has no predictive power with respect to outflows from
unemployment. 3 8
We now come to labour market policies.  The initial unemployment  benefit scheme
set  up  January  1990 was  relatively generous to  the  unemployed in  terms  of
compensation, eligibility as well as in terms of duration. In January 1992 a more
restrictive scheme was introduced in order to cut costs and to create more incentives
for job  search.  The maximum period during which an unemployed may receive
benefits was shortened to six month instead of one year.  The benefit is 60% of net
average income in the last quarter of employment  for the first three months, 50% for
the next 3 months. The minimum benefit is the subsistence level set by law, the
ceiling is set at 3000 koruna.  Eligible are only individuals who have either worked,
371n transition economies it might not be very sensible to look at purely spatial closeness  in order to
make out a link between  Westem  product  demand  and production  in transition  economies. The
infrastructure in such countries is very underdeveloped  and a location further away from the border
but closer to a main highway (Autobahn)  might be a more favourable location as far as transportation
costs for Western firms are concerned.
380f course, inflows into small production need not have unemployment  as their origin state but can
also originate from employment,  their results  support our conclusion,  therefore,  only partially.43
studied or taken care of a child under three years of age for 12 months during the
previous  three years.
After the introduction of this new benefit scheme the ratio of benefit receivers to all
unemployed  fell from 72% to 58% in January and to about 35% in the first half of
1993. The unemployment  rate fell gradually from 4.4% in January 1992 to below 3%,
but since August 1993 it has been constantly  above 3%.
Active labour market policies were introduced in June 1991 in the Czech and Slovak
Republics. They are administered by the district employment  offices, implying that
they have considerable discretion over the amounts to  allocate to  active labour
market policies as a share of total spending and over how to implement  the different
programmes  (in 1994  jan-sept active labour market polices shares of total spending
ranged from 6,3% to 46,7% in the different districts and averaged 24,8%).
Since 1991 unemployment has been considerably reduced by active employment
measures in  the  Czech  Republic.  In  1991 the  number of  people who  found
employment  through such a measure  amounted  on average to a share of 48% of the
unemployed,  when unemployment  reached its highest level so far of over 4%. In the
following year after the tightening of unemployment  benefits in January 1992, the
share was up to 77%, but unemployment  dropped back below 3%. In 1993 and the
number of people employed through active labour market policies was reduced to
less than a third of its 1992 level or 28% of unemployment. In 1994 the share of
active  labour market policies  has been markedly reduced so far,  even  though
unemployment  is picking up again. The share of employment  through active labour
market policies to unemployment  was 15% on average from January to September
1994.
Under the assumption  that entry into an ALMP scheme implies  a one-for-one outflow
from the unemployment  register the unemployment  rate in the Czech Republic  would
have  been  1.5-2% points  higher in  1991 and  1992: in  1993 and  1994 these
employment  policies reduced directly the unemployment  rate by, however, less than
1  % point with a decreasing tendency.  Looking at the net effect of ALMPs (taking
into consideration substitution effects and dead weight loss) the differentials in the
unemployment  rate implied by these policies should  be, however, smaller.
In 1991 and in 1992 emphasis was put on long-term employment creation policies
called "Socially Purposeful Jobs (SPJ)". The created jobs  in this scheme were a
major  source  of  oufflow  out  of  unemployment (SPJs  accounted for  35%  of44
unemployment in 1991 and 50% in  1992). Their impact has been considerably
reduced in 1993 and 1994 to less than 10% of unemployment.  From 1991 until 1993
less than one third of subsidised employment  were short-term public work measures
called "Publicly Useful Jobs (PUJ)", but in 1994 44% of all employment measures
were PUJs. In 1993 the two measures  were equal in importance, both considerably
reduced to about 12,000  jobs, and during the first 9 month of 1994 there were on
average even less SPJs than PUJs. "Retraining" and "Practice for Young People"
are two additional measures that  only picked up  momentum in  1992 and  1993
respectively. In 1993 they both were of roughly the same magnitude as PUJs, but in
the first half of 1994 they amounted  together for only half the number of PUJs. The
"Practice for Young People" policy has grown in importance,  however.
Total spending on unemployment  reached its peak in 1992 with more than 3 billion
of  Koruna or  0.4% of  GDP, although more restrictive benefits regulations were
introduced at the beginning of that year. Expenses  in 1993 total spending fell back to
approximately the 1992 level of more than 2 billion of Koruna or 0.3% of GDP. In
1994 so far, absolute spending is in the same range, even if it will probably reach a
share of GDP of about 0,4%. Expenses  on active labour market policies accounted
for more than 50% of total spending only in 1992. Before and after that spending on
active labour market policies has been about one third of total spending, apparently
falling to a quarter in 1994.
ALMPs as implemented  in the CR can have distortive and positive effects.  On one
hand, there is a risk of dead weight loss, especially  with SPJ that tend to be given to
individuals, who are well qualified. Possibly they might have found a job anyhow,
and the subsidised job would have been created even without the subsidy.  On the
other hand, in a transforming economy with capital markets only emerging and an
initial  lack  of  entrepreneurial skill  subsidising job  creation  for  well  qualified
individuals may help in enterprise formation; for instance, such subsidisation may
allow a new firm to access the capital market with the guarantee of the employment
office. If subsidised  jobs support the development  of the private sector that would not
have taken place otherwise  due to market imperfections,  a SPJ or retraining scheme
or trainee programme may trigger further job creations and thus can lead to more
than just the direct effect of keeping an unemployed  off the dole for a certain period
of time.
The estimation of  augmented matching functions produces, in  principal, the  net
effect of  ALMPs on  oufflows from  unemployment.  Burda and  Lubyova (1995)
estimate functions similar to equation (5) in section 3.2.3 for the Czech and Slovak45
Republics  using district level data.  For the Czech Republic, their variables capturing
regional  ALMP  activity  are  potential stocks  of  PUJ  and  SPJ  or  total  district
expenditures on ALMP.  The available data on ALMP participants are in the form of
"agreements" concluded with municipalities  or private employers  and are, therefore,
clearly an upper bound of the actual stocks.
According to their results, in the Czech regressions ALMP participation stocks are
not  statistically  significant  predictors  of  outflows  from  unemployment  into
employment while total district spending on ALMP are statistically significant in all
specifications. The imputed long-run elasticity of spending with respect to outflows,
0.068 means that if in the Czech Republic spending  had not fallen from 1992 to 1993
by 56%, outflows from unemployment  would have been raised by 12.4% implying a
decrease in the  steady state rate  of  unemployment from  3.3% to  3%.  Their
econometric  evidence  confirms  the  previous  supposition  about  the  marginal
influence of ALMPs on the Czech labour market  as it points to a discernible but small
effect of ALMPs  on the Czech unemployment  rate.
Regional labour mobility might also contribute to outflows from unemployment. High
regional  labour  mobility  can  offset  regional  differences in  unemployment and
vacancies, as job  applicants move (migrate or commute) from regions with high
unemployment  to vacancy ratios (low wages) to regions  with less tight labour market
conditions (high wage). As a result regional matching  according to skill demand and
supply  is  improved, even  if  firms  and  capital are  slow to  move. Better factor
allocation leads to lower regional unemployment  dispersion, but also to lower overall
unemployment due  to  more efficient use of  available  resources. According to
Erbenova (1995) regional disparities in unemployment, vacancies and wage have
increased in the last four years. The eastern half of the CR has almost entirely
unemployment  rates above 3 and often above 5%, whereas  the west of the country,
especially  that  part  which  borders  at  Germany has  distinctly  lower  regional
unemployment rates.  Vacancies follow  a  reversed pattern.  Regional  wage
variations have increased since the beginning of transformation,  while regional net
migration  flows are small.
Prague has a net inflow of people, which is conform  with the fact that unemployment
is extremely low there and the private sector is booming.  Commuting, which was
considerable even before transformation, has increased further and in 1991 about
30% of the labour force commuted  to work, mainly short distances. Because of the
limits of the housing market, commuting seems  to be preferred to migration. PDeople46
commute to regions of low unemployment and relatively high wages.  In the CR
labour mobility goes into the direction  which is predicted  by theory.
3.3.4 The Czech labour market:  outflow out of the labour  force
Workers may leave the labour  force either directly from employment  or after a period
of unemployment. In the CR immediately  after the beginning of the reform policies
large numbers of pensioners and women left the labour force.  Czech women at any
rate  have  the  left  the  labour force  in  larger  numbers than  in  other transition
economies  where women have preferred to remain in the state of unemployment  (cf.
IMF, op. cit and Ham et al., op. cit.).  This labour force withdrawal of large numbers
of pensioners and women has certainly in the short run softened the unemployment
problem in the CR. What is, however,  more interesting is the temporary labour  force
exit of generally young and relatively well skilled persons who have chosen to work
in Germany and Austria. 39 These persons might relieve pressure on the  Czech
labour market in the medium run since, if they chose to work at home, they might
very likely "crowd out" of employment  persons  who are now at work but have "worse
characteristics"  than the temporary "emigrants".
According to informal estimates of German and Czechs officials Germany there is
about one illegal Czech worker per legal Czech worker and there are altogether
about 100.000 Czech who work abroad. In  1993 there were about 34 thousand
Legally employed Czechs in Germany,  of whom 70% worked in Bavaria and 40% in
the  Bavarian Border Regions (cf. table  14).  What  should be looked at  is  the
development after 1990 as Czech workers in 1990 were mainly emigrees who had
worked in Germany for a long time.  The dynamics for the years 1991-1993, while
impressive, are not that substantial to have caused a major reduction in the Czech
unemployment rate.  The  40% working in  Bavarian Border regions are  mainly
persons residing close to the border who are allowed to work there permanently as
long as the local Bavarian labour market situation makes this possible.  With the
onset of  the  recession in  Germany in  1993 new hirings of  such cross border
commuters declined somewhat as table  14 shows.  While the numbers of cross
border commuters is not large relative to the Czech labour force one should note,
though, that the CR is the only transition economy bordering at a Western country
and having secured such a generous agreement  on in principal limitless crossborder
commuting.  The impulse the commuters give to the local economy on the Czech
39 Svejnar, Terrell and Munich (1995) provide some evidence of significantly lower inflows into
unemployment  in border regions.47
side should also not be neglected.  To the number of Czech persons working in
Germany need also to be added workers who are employed by a Czech firm that
subcontracts with a German firm (Werkvertraege).  Such persons are counted as
employed in the CR.  While in 1992 this number was quite large, it fell to under a
thousand in 1993 (cf. table 14).
The number of legal Czech workers in Austria is with approximately 4 000 much
smaller (Erbenova, op. cit.).  If one, however, assumes that those working abroad
would with a factor of 0.5 "crowd out" persons thus far employed, in that case one
would need to  add  50, 000 to the  stock of  unemployed which would raise the
unemployment  in e.g. 1993 by 0.6 percentage  points.
As  the  last  calculation  shows  individual  determinants  of  a  relatively  low
unemployment  rate are not necessarily impressive, however the sum of all factors
which  possibly  have,  aside  from  ALMPs,  an  influence  on  the  low  Czech
unemployment rate  is  surely  more  important than  the  tools  used  by  Czech
employment  offices in their fight against unemployment.
V Are there Lessons  for the Russian  Federation?
The large negative shocks  to output  which have cccurred in all member states of the
CIS  have  resulted  in  uniformly low  levels of  registered unemployment.  The
underemployment  of labour has expressed itself in a different manner  than in Central
Europe.  Firms have thus far not shed labour in a massive  way but have "convinced"
workers to work short-time, to go on involuntary extended leave or to work without
pay for long periods of time.  On the one hand, workers find these arrangements
psychologically advantageous as they speculate on a return to  normal hours of
employment at  regular  pay  sometime in  the  future.  As  many workers  have
secondary  employment  in  the  informal  sector  and  as  eligibility  criteria  for
unemployment benefits are tough and these benefits in turn minimal there are also
hardly any economic incentives for workers to  register officially as  unemployed.
While  the  above said is generally true for  all  states of  the  CIS, labour market
performance  varies widely. As there exists empirical analysis of the Russian labour
market which is unparalleled in its detailed data analysis in other CIS states, events
in the Russian Federation  will be briefly presented. They can serve only as a limited
basis for the assessment of ALMP implications in the CIS since the Russian labour
market seems  much more "dynamic"  than labour markets  in other CIS states.48
Although there are some measurement  problems as far as labour market (in)activity
in Russia is concerned (Commander  and Yemtsov, 1995) the following facts can be
presented  with some confidence:
- Registered unemployment  has been very small compared to virtually all transition
economies in Central Europe (about 2 percent in mid-1  994), but even unemployment
data using household surveys  indicate a true rate of only  5-6%  (Centre  for
Economic  Analysis, 1994).
- Unlike in all other transition economies, registered  unemployment  has thus far not
been a stagnant pool but rather dynamic: with low inflow rates, outflow rates from
registered unemployment  into regular employment  have been large and comparable
to  the  rates  in the  Czech Republic and  in OECD countries while the  average
duration of unemployment  has been short.
- The majority of separations in 1992 and 1993 has been voluntary quits while
employment  reductions  were only the second most important reason for separations
(Commander,  McHale and Yemtsov, 1995).
- A substantial part of the workforce in Russian industry remains in their primary jobs
on extended leave. While primary employment of these persons is mainly in the
state sector many of them have secondary  employment  in the private or semi-private
sector. Often the latter employment  has short working hours, is higher paid but also
more risky than employment  in the state sector.
- There  is  a  strong  bias  in  (un)employment legislation against  registering  as
unemployed. For example, persons who received severance  pay in the years 1992
and  1993 were  not  eligible for  unemployment benefits and  had, therefore, no
incentive to register. Also, the probability of receiving benefits when registering is
very low, so again there is no incentive to apply to an Emplcyment Centre (EC).
Furthermore,  especially in rural areas distances  to EC's can be considerable,  clearly
discouraging the  unemployed to  register.  Finally,  as  EC's have  a  very  poor
reputation with firn  managers, the  former do  not  offer  efficient job  brokerage
services to the unemployed  (cf. Standing and Chetvernina, 1994)
- With very low rates of registered  unemployment  in the early phase of transition the
share  of  women  unemployment has  been  disproportionally high  (about  70%).
Analysis of registered unemployment rates at  the regional level by  Commander,
McHale and  Yemtsov (1995)  show, however, an  inverse relationship between49
unemployment rates and women's unemployment shares.  For the future, when
registered unemployment is expected to  rise substantially this would imply that
women's unemployment share should approach their share of  the  labour force.
Whether one  can detect in household survey data for  1992 and  1993 problem
groups will be briefly discussed  below.
- Even with  strongly  downward biased  registered unemployment and  notified
vacancies regional divergence in U/V ratios is impressive.  For example, in the
Central Region (Central'nyj Rajon) the  City of  Moscow has  had throughout the
transition  period  a  UN  ratio  of  well  below  one  while  the  district  of  Ivanov
(Ivanovskaja  Oblast') had a UN ratio of 15 in June 1993, reaching the value of 75 in
June 1994 (Centre for Economic  Analysis, 1994). The overall figures certainly hide
this kind of regional mismatch!
- The same data also show an inverse relationship between the UN  ratio of an
oblast' and  the  distance to  Moscow.  As  official  employment has substantially
contracted in Moscow low UN ratios in Moscow and surroundings  seem to indicate
that in agglomeration  centres like Moscow  the shadow  economy provides substantial
employment  opportunities  not captured by official data.
- At least until the middle  of 1994, unemployed  flowing back into employment  had as
their largest destination the state sector.  Firms in the state sector seem to have
increased on average their level of labour hoarding made possible by subsidies
provided by the central budget. Commander  et al. (1995) show why given a certain
technology firms might in the light of  negative output shocks prefer to  increase
labour hoarding instead of choosing  employment  reductions  via attrition.
While these presented  facts have been established looking mainly at aggregate data
additional insights about labour market experiences of various groups have been
gained by analysing household survey data.  The following discussion is based on
Foley's (1995) estimates of annual transitions between 1992 and 1993.  It neglects
the  issue  of  round-tripping  which  should  be  kept  in  mind  especially  for
unemployment  transitions given their magnitude in the Russian labour market during
the reported period
Comparing gross transition probabilities between the three states of the  Russian
labour market with those of eastern Germany during the first phase of transition
(Bellmann et al.,  1995) and Poland (G6ra and Lehmann, 1995), some interesting
patterns can be seen. The probability of remaining in employment  is clearly greater50
in Russia (91%) than in eastern Germany (84%) or  in Poland (88%).  Also job
accession rates  are  larger  in  Russia  (60%)  than  in  the  other  two  transition
economies (54% and 46% respectively).  Over the year nearly two thirds of the
Russian unemployed  leave the unemployment  stock. Whilst for Poland this number
is  only  52%,  eastern  Germany has  comparable large  annual  outflows  from
unemployment. However, in the latter case the outflows are nearly evenly divided
between job accessions and labour force withdrawal (35% and 27%).  The large
majority of Russian  outflows consists instead  of job accessions  (51%), with only 16%
withdrawing from the labour force.  Finally, the inflow rate into unemployment is
marginally lower than in Poland (3.3% cf. to 4%) and a lot lower than in eastern
Germany (9.3%) where after monetary and social union SOE's relentlessly shed
labour.  The interesting point coming out of these comparisons is that, unlike in
Poland, unemployment in Russia is not a stagnant pool but has a rather dynamic
nature.  This is derived above all from large outflows out of unemployment  while
inflows are comparable  to transition economies in Central Europe  which in turn have
relatively low inflow rates (Boeri, 1994). In Central Europe, persons, once flown into
unemployment, have on average great difficulties leaving this state while Russian
unemployed,  on the LFS measure, do not share this experience during the reported
period. 40
While  the  usual demographic patterns of  gross transition  probabilities can  be
observed in the Russian sample (e.g. larger labour force withdrawal rates for older
workers) very strong patterns by demographic characteristics (gender, age  and
education) which allow the identification of problem groups cannot be made out for
the  reported period.  Foley's disaggregation of  employment into the  set  {state
enterprise, private enterprise, work collective, otherwise owned, self-employment)
shows why this is so: the labour market  experience  of various demographic  groups is
in fact sector-specific.  While women, older persons and the less educated have
essentially better prospects in state enterprises, men, younger  persons and the more
educated  fare better in the private sector and self-employment. As state enterprises
stop labour hoarding and commence employment  reductions in earnest, it is likely
that also in Russia a person with one or more of the characteristics  of the first group
mentioned will experience a deteriorating labour market experience.  The thus far
analysed data do show a very different behaviour of state owned firms with a strong
element of  labour hoarding which seems to  help those groups which  in  other
transition economies bear the brunt of the restructuring  effort.
40 Note that Commander and Yemtsov come to a similar assessment, using aggregate  data, for a
period well into 1994.51
From the case study by Nemova and Lippolt (1995) of Russian Federal Employment
Services (FES) it is known that many of the tools to combat unemployment  used in
the cited transition economies of Central Europe have also been employed in the
Russian Federation.  However, the net effects of  the application of e.g. training
schemes and public works cannot be inferred from their study 4l.  Also, their study
does not embed the discussion of ALMPs into the above presented context of the
Russian labour market.  Combining the presented stylised facts of the  Russian
labour market with the evidence on the effects of ALMPs in Central Europe one can
draw  some  general, very  tentative lessons for  policy  makers in  the  Russian
Federation.
From the discussion on the age structure of Polish unemployment  it should be clear
that it  is a rather complex undertaking to  identify problem groups with certainty.
Participation rates of such groups need to be analysed and compared to economies
with  similar development and  age  structure.  Relatively low  participation rates,
especiallv of  the young,  might hint at  greater opportunities in the  rather large
shadow economy than  in  the  formal sector.  As  a  counterweighing argument,
Russian employment legislation is rather restrictive in  its  recognition of  benefit
entitlement and, given  often high  transportation costs, might produce a  strong
downward bias for the groups who are especially vulnerable. One of the major tasks
of the FES at this point in time, i.e. before registered  unemployment  will reach levels
of other transition economies, should be to promote employment  legislation and to
develop an  infrastructure which both allow the identification of the true  problem
groups among the unemployed.
With  continuous labour hoarding in state enterprises, wage subsidy programmes
seem an  absurd variant of  ALMPs which always should be considered flanking
measures for the economic transformation  towards a market economy.  Given the
political structures at the local and regional level, it seems rather an illusion to try to
restrict such subsidies to  de novo private firms which could be targeted without
retarding the restructuring efforts of policy makers.
The stylised facts, presented  above, point, at least for the reported period (beginning
of reform programme  to the middle  of 1994), to a differently performing  labour market
than in e.g. Hungary and Poland.  Overall oufflow from unemployment,  using the
LFS measure, is much higher and problem groups cannot be made out, at least if
one uses as an identifier the outflow rate from unemployment. Nevertheless,  there
41  Unfortunately,they do  not  discuss possible distortive  effects  of  the  various  labour  market
programmes.52
are possible lessons from the experience of  Central European countries as the
"dynamic" overall performance of the Russian labour market seems misleading in
two  respects.  First, even  now the  overall figures  disguise  the  huge  regional
variations in UN ratios. There clearly are already areas where labour demand is low
and where the unemployed have difficulties flowing out of unemployment.  In such
regions (i.e. oblasts) it  is important for  ECs to  study whether there are already
problem  groups  similar  to  those  identified  in  other  transition  economies  by
comparing the  outflow rates of  specific groups.  Secondly, as large firms (state
owned or privatised) start to  shed labour in earnest the pool of the  unemployed
should rise to levels which will be comparable  to other transition economies. In that
case it is inconceivable  that the outflow rates from unemployment,  thus far observed,
can be maintained  and one should expect bad labour market experiences  for certain
groups similar to countries in Central Europe.  Thus the labour market situation in
other transition economies already pertains in certain Russian regions already now
and will pertain for most Russian regions in the near future.  There will be strong
competition  among  the unemployed  about the rather scarce  jobs and opportunities in
the de novo private sector and the shadow economy will not be large enough to
absorb such a portion of the pool of the unemployed  which would guarantee small
stocks of unemployment  and short durations. Therefore, labour market policies can
be discussed using their assessment in Central European countries even if now the
labour market performance  in Russia seems  very different.
Most transition  economies  in Central  Europe  (CE) have used a wide menu of ALMPs  to
combat  unemployment. However,  because  of budgetary  constraints,  but also because
of the crowding  out of active  measures  by the increasing  needs  for income  maintenance
expenditures  on ALMPs  have for the most part only been a small fraction  of total labour
market  expenditures. This is one reason why ALMPs have hardly affected  the overall
unemployment  rate in these countries. The Czech  example  showed,  on the other hand,
that even where the share of expenditures  on ALMPs is high a  bundle of factors
determines  the low unemployment  rate among  which ALMP has not been identified  as
the most important  one. In the CIS one often  meets  with the naive  expectation  that large
ALMP measures  will successfully  reduce  the unemployment  rate.  One of the tasks of
Russian  policy makers  should consist  in explaining  to the population  that such policies
can only have marginal  effects  in the labour  market. It will be equally  important  to resist
the temptation  to offer (on paper, as it is done in most transition economies)  a wide
menu  of ALMPs and to instead  concentrate  on one or two policies most appropriate  for
the region  in question.53
The experience  in Central European  Countries  leads one to conclude  that it is difficult  to
design from  scratch ALMPs in  such a  way that they  minimise distortive effects.
Normally, a  long learning process is  needed to  remedy the  deficiencies in  the
(un)employment  legislation  which generate  distortions. In Russia, given the extreme
budget problems  of local authorities  the danger of fiscal substitution  effects of public
employment  programmes  seems especially  great and it is essential to devise these
programmes  accordingly.
When targeting ALMPs one should have a clear idea what one wants to  achieve,
whether  one wants to increase  efficiency  or equity. Most programmes  in CE targeted at
problem groups, like the long-term unemployed,  the older and the  less educated
workers, do not seem to generate efficiency gains.  Taking retraining and public
employment  schemes  as an example,  if they are targeted  at problem  groups  they do not
seem to increase the average probability  of re-employment  of persons belonging to
these groups.  Poorly educated  unemployed  workers,  even after a retraining measure
have to compete  with a large pool of unemployed  with "better characteristics"  and with
people still employed  in declining  sectors. Participants  of public employment  schemes
are often, like in OECD  countries,  stigmatised  as low productivity  workers,  consequently
participation  in such schemes in fact reduces re-employment  probabilities.  It seems
sensible, though, to  use public employment  programmes  for  equity reasons when
targeting  the long-term  unemployed  for example. Such  persons  have experienced  long
periods of reduced income and should on equity grounds have the opportunity to
temporarily  gain a relatively  high income. Retraining  measures,  on the other hand,  must
generate some efficiency gains if they are to be employed.  If targeted at problem
groups, careful vetting is  necessary to  select only those with intrinsic ability, with
flexibility  and drive. Such careful  vetting  imposes,  however,  great demands  on the staff
at ECs which,  given the staff/client  ratio in most transition  economies,  cannot  be met. In
order to ensure some efficiency  gains Russian  ECs should develop clear ideas about
which groups to target for retraining  measures  before introducing  such measures  on a
large  scale.
Measures  to promote  self-employment  should  definitely  be stressed  as there are some
positive  experiences  with such measures  in the Czech Republic  and in Poland. As the
financial infrastructure  is certainly  not better in the Russian Federation  the arguments
previously made in the Czech example  for the granting of loans to carefully vetted
participants  also hold.
One type of programme  that has been thus far ignored in transition economies is a
programme  like the British  Restart  Programme  which advises  unemployed  persons  with54
spells  longer  than  six months  about their  possibilities  in the labour  market. As registered
unemployment  will rise in Russia,  so will long-term  unemployment.  Rather than be too
ambitious with  the  more  conventional programmes, like  retraining  and  public
employment,  Russian ECs should first develop a  good infrastructure  of consulting
services for  all  the  unemployed and  especially for  problem groups among the
unemployed  like e.g. the long-term  unemployed. This would not only improve the
matching process but would also go a long way to  improve the poor image which
government  run ECs  have among  Russian  workers  (Standing  and Chetvernina,  op. cit.).
VI Conclusions
Transition economies have introduced a wide range of  OECD ALMPs to  combat
unemployment.  Many of these measures  are, however,  rather  on paper than employed
in any substantial  way in practice since with the rise of the stock of unemployment  in
most  transition  economies  to levels  comparable  with OECD  countries,  passive  measures
have crowded out ALMPs.  But even where this was not the case, like in the Czech
Republic,  ALMPs  have only marginally  contributed  to the lowering  of the unemployment
rate.  Having looked at  various determinants contributing to  the  extremely low
unemployment rate  in  the  Czech Republic, in  comparison with  other transition
economies  and with OECD  countries,  the conclusion  was reached  that ALMPs  explained
only a small fraction of this unemployment  rate differential. To remove misperceptions
by the public, one important  task of policy  makers  in CEE has to be to bring across  the
message  that even under the best circumstances  ALMPs  can only play a marginal  role
in bringing  down the unemployment  rate.
Despite their marginal role, ALMPs can be  useful also  in  transition economies.
However,  the situation  in CEE labour markets  is different  from that in OECD countries
which prohibits a mechanical  application  of OECD ALMPs to these labour markets.
Because of severe and persistent  shortages in capital and managerial  ability labour
demand  is and will stay in the medium  term weak while labour  supply,  among  others  for
demographic  reasons,  will be abundant.  Consequently,  labour  shed in those enterprises
which restructure  or are liquidated  cannot be absorbed  in its entirety  by the expanding
private sector which leads to unemployment  also affecting  core groups of employment
and to  more competition among the  unemployed  than this is  the case in  OECD
countries. Certain problem groups which were identified in the Hungarian  and Polish
case as those who are older and less educated  seem  to have very poor prospects  for
future employment. In these two countries, also women have lower probabilities of
regaining  employment  than men55
Because  problem  groups have to compete  for jobs in the expanding  private sector  with
many unemployed  from core groups of employment  and with persons who are still
employed in the state sector, the usual rationale for targeting retraining and public
employment  measures  at problem  groups,  i.e. to integrate  them into  the effective  labour
supply, has to be questioned in transition economies.  If e.g. one targets retraining
measures  at those  with vocational  training  who have both  in Hungary  and Poland  a high
incidence  of unemployment  it is in no way clear whether  this will on average increase
their re-employment  protbabilities  as they have to compete  with many people  with much
better educational backgrounds  who  are in  addition probably perceived as  more
productive  by prospective  employers. Alternatively  to targeting  retraining measures  at
all members of problem groups one could carefully vet these groups for flexibility,
intrinsic ability and drive and choose only people with such characteristics  for such
measures. O'Leary's  (1994) Hungarian  results  seem  to suggest  that people  with these
characteristics  from problem groups benefit most from being taken on a retraining
programme. Given  the very low staff/client  ratios  in most CEE countries  the realisation
of this alternative  on a large scale seems,  however,  not very feasible. Because  of the
very scarce resources for  ALMPs it might be more sensible to  use the funds for
retraining to  solve various skill bottlenecks by targeting the most able among the
unemployed.
Public  employment  programmes  should  above  all be targeted  at problem  groups  and the
long-term  unemployed. 42 This should be done mainly  for equity rather than efficiency
reasons. Since persons  through  participation  in a public  works scheme  do on average
not improve  their re-employment  probability  or in actual fact might  lower this probability
because of  signalling problems and  the  value  added from  public  employment
programmes  are most likely small, efficiency  gains cannot be great. Nevertheless,  it is
certainly  more  equitable  to temporarily  allow  groups  access  to relative  high income  who
have suffered  disproportionately  from income  losses. The main point is to have a clear
idea whether both efficiency  or equity aims can be pursued  and if efficiency  gains are
unrealistic  whether  equity considerations  are politically  indispensable.
One  programme of  ALMPs which  has  been  used  only  rarely  promotes self-
employment. Given embryonic financial structures risk assessment  cannot be done
extensively by the private banking sector such that those among the unemployed
who want to create their own businesses will experience severe credit rationing.
Employment  Offices through granting start-up loans can contribute to the removal of
42Assuming  some heterogeneity  among the unemployed  and efficient sorting many of the long-term
unemployed belong to one of the problem groups. With very low outflow rates from unemployment,
many of the long-term unemployed  do not belong  to a problem group,  but are just the unlucky ones.56
this distortion arising from credit rationing.  The empirical evidence cited from the
Czech Republic and from Poland hinted at the effectiveness of such programmes.
As  services  in  the  untradables sector  are  underdeveloped in  most  transition
economies displacement of output effects which are prominent in OECD countries
with self-employment  schemes  should be small.
Employment  Offices in Hungary, Poland and Russia have a very poor record as far
as job brokerage is concerned.  Empirical evidence in Poland and Russia pointed
also to large informational deficits among the unemployed. One aim that should be
vigorously pursued before a wide menu of ALMPs is tried out is the improvement  of
the consulting services for the unemployed. In this context increasing the consulting
efforts for problem groups seems  especially worthy.  For example, along the lines of
a programme  like Restart the longer-term  unemployed43  should be interviewed and
given advice about possible job  openings and eligibility criteria for  state funded
employment activities.  Putting consultative programmes  at the  centre of ALMPs
rather than fall into some "wild activism" which tries to apply a wide menu of OECD
ALMPs would be a more modest  but also a more realistic effort.
The labour market in the Russian Federation has for the reported period (1992-
1994) been  much more "dynamic" than  the  typical  labour market in transition
economies (e.g. Hungary and Poland) and in its performance,  i.e. low unemployment
incidence and large outflows from unemployment  for virtually all groups, been much
closer to the only low unemployment  labour market of CE (the Czech labour market).
The reasons for this performance  are, however,  very different from the Czech case.
One of the central reasons has been continued massive labour hoarding on the part
of Russian enterprises.  One would expect Russia to reach unemployment levels
which are more typical for transition economies, once enterprises begin to shed
labour in earnest.  In future, the policy conclusions concerning ALMPs should,
therefore,  not  be  very  different from  those  presented for  the  other  transition
economies.
43 Since unemployment benefits are in most transition economies cut off after 12 months and many
persons are deregistered  after the cut off point it seems sensible,  as it is done in Britain, to invite the
unemployed  to an interview after six months of unemployment.57
Table  1
Public Expenditure and Participant Inflows in Labour Market Programmes (%)
Hungary
1992  1993  1992  1993
Programme categories  Total expenditure as  Total expenditure as  Participant inflows as  Participant inflows
0% of GDP  % of GDP  % of lab. force  as % of lab. force
1.  Public employment services and administration  0.15  0.16
2.  Labour market training  0 15  0.24  0.95  1.42
a) Training for unemployed adults and those at risk  0.15  0.24  0.95  1.42
b) Training for employed adults
3.  Youth measures
a) Measures for unernployed and disadvantaged youth
b) Support of apprenticeship and related forms of ge-  neral
youth training
4.  Subsidised employment  0.33  0.30  2.89  2.64
a) Subsidies to regular employment in private sector  0.15  0.11  1.89  0.94
b) Support of unemployed persons starting enterprises  0.08  0 05  0.60  0.72
c) Direct job creation (public or non-profit)  0 10  0.14  0.39  0.99
5.  Measures for the disabled
a) Vocational rehabilitation
b) Work for the disabled
6  Unemployment compensation  2 26  2.14
7  Early retirement for labour market reasons  0.06  0.11
TOTAL  2 95  2.96  3.83  4.06
- Active measures (1-5)  0.64  0.70  3.83  4.06
- "Mobilising labour market supply' (2a, 3a, 4a-b, 5a)  0.38  0.40  3.44  3.07
- "Non-targeted training" (2b, 3b)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
- "Work as a social objective" (4c, 5b)  0.10  0.14  0.39  0.99
- Passive measures (6-7)  2.32  2.26  0.00  0.00
Source:  Labour Ministry, Budapest, Hungary58
Table 2
Public Expenditure and Participant Inflows in Labour Market Programmes (%)
Czech Republic
1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993
Programme categories  A  A  A  B  B  B
1. Public employment services and administration  0.08  0.10  0.11
2. Labour market training  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.34  0.20
3. Work experience for school leavers  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.27  0.42  0.14
4. Subsidised employment  0.08  0.16  0.05  0.89  2.27  0.47
a) Subsidies to regular employment in private  0.05  0.10  0.02  0.40  1.22  0.16
sector  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.22  0.50  0.08
b) Support of unemployed persons starting  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.27  0.55  0.23
enterprises
c) Direct job creation (public or non-profit)
5. Supported work for the disabled  ..  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02
6. Unemployment compensation  0.23  0.20  0.16
TOTAL  0.41  0.53  0.36  1.26  3.05  0.83
A Total expenditure as percent of GDP
B Participant inflows as percent of labour force
Source:  OECD59
Table 3
Labour Market Expenditure as Percentage of GDP
Poland
1990  1991  1992  1993
Labour fund/GDP  (%)  0.63  1.65  2.00  2.01
Labourfund/GDP  (%)-  0.54  1.50  1.84  1.93
adjusted
PLMP/GDP (%)  0.32  1.35  1.72  1.68
ALMP/GDP  (%)  0.29  0.26  0.25  0.31
ALMP/GDP (%)-adjusted  0.20  0.11  0.09  0.23
Source:  G6ra (1995) and own calculations.
Table 4
Expenditure  on Labour Market Programmes (Nominal; Billions PLZ)
Poland
1990  1991  1992  1993
Training/retraining  16.0  90.0  192.9  449.5
Intervention  works  209.0  453.0  468.8  1366.3
Public works  174.2  1196.9
Start-up loans  962.0  404.0  237.5  532.6
Apprenticeship  504.0  1213.0  1789.0  1321.7
*  Public Works started  in 1992.
Source:  G6ra (1995).60
Table 5
Number  of People on Various  Labour Market Schemes
Poland
No. of people on  1990  1991  1992  1993
schemes  ('000)
Training/retraining  10.3  68.1  70.2  72.7
Intervention  works  106.9  36.0  104.5  132.7
Public works  35.5  74.1
Sum of people on schemes  117.2  104.1  210.2  279.5
Share of scheme  20.3  6.4  9.0  10.3
participants in total
unemployment  (%)
Apprenticeship  x  x  400.0  320.0
Start-up loans  x  x  9.8  11.7
*  Public Works started in 1992.
x  comparable data are not fully reliable.
Source:  G6ra (1995).61
Table  6
Participation  Rates, Unemployment  Rates, Long-term  Unemployment  Shares
for Men and Women by Age - May 1992
Poland
age brackets  Men  Women
(years)  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU sha-  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU
te  te  re  te  te  share
< 25  0.469  0.231  0.197  0.377  0.300  0.166
25 - 34  0.946  0.122  0.275  0.733  0.169  0.259
35 - 44  0.935  0.107  0.251  0.854  0.109  0.318
45 - 54  0.815  0.075  0.326  0.737  0.081  0.275
55 - 64 (men)  0.505  0.072  0.163
55 - 59 (women)  0.376  0.045  0.538
> 65 (men)  0.211  0.040  0.300
Ž 60 (women)  0.156  0.026  0.364
Participation  Rates, Unemployment  Rates, Long-term  Unemployment  Shares
for Men and Women by Age - May 1993
Poland
age brackets  Men  Women
(years)  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU sha-  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU
te  te  re  te  te  share
< 25  0.522  0.227  0.346  0.410  0.280  0.416
25 - 34  0.937  0.101  0.494  0.771  0.159  0.505
35 - 44  0.917  0.097  0.379  0.854  0.107  0.507
45 - 54  0.790  0.076  0.402  0.699  0.096  0.476
55 - 64 (men)  0.459  0.052  0.375
55 - 59 (women)  0.375  0.093  0.259
> 65 (men)  0.216  0.047  0.333
Ž 60 (women)  0.167  0.042  0.526
Source:  own calculations62
Table 7
Labour Market  Transition  Probabilities
from Unemployment  for Men by Duration
May 1992  to May 1993
Poland
Months  Origin Stock  UE  UU  UN
0 s x s 3  157  0.465  0.401  0.134
3 < x s 6  154  0.416  0.461  0.123
6 < x ￿  9  95  0.432  0.453  0.116
9 < x < 12  175  0.377  0.491  0.131
x>  12  190  0.416  0.426  0.158
Labour Market  Transition  Probabilities
from Unemployment  for Women  by Duration
May 1992 to May 1993
Poland
Months  Origin Stock  UE  UU  UN
0 < x < 3  145  0.248  0.593  0.159
3 < x s 6  139  0.245  0.518  0.237
6 < x s 9  101  0.386  0.396  0.218
9 < x s 12  177  0.379  0.441  0.181
x>  12  197  0.299  0.548  0.152
Source:  own calculations63
Table 8
Labour Market  Transition  Probabilities  for Men by Educational  Category
May 1992 to May 1993
Poland
Origin Stock  E  U  N
University
E  548  0.958  0.015  0.027
U  30  0.467  0.233  0.300
N  138  0.167  0.014  0.819
Postsecondary
E  82  0.902  0.024  0.073
U  7  0.571  0.143  0.286
N  18  0.278  0.056  0.667
Sec.vocational
E  1123  0.928  0.043  0.029
U  116  0.509  0.345  0.147
N  319  0.163  0.041  0.796
Sec.  general
E  216  0.889  0.014  0.097
U  23  0.217  0.435  0.348
N  162  0.123  0.056  0.821
Vocational
E  2323  0.911  0.052  0.037
U  366  0.451  0.467  0.082
N  601  0.153  0.123  0.724
Elementary
E  1553  0.825  0.046  0.129
U  219  0.338  0.511  0.151
N  1540  0.078  0.014  0.908
Incompl.  Schooling
E  135  0.711  0.007  0.281
U  10  0.200  0.300  0.500
N  289  0.055  0.003  0.941
Source:  own calculations64
Table 9
Labour  Market  Transition  Probabilities  for Women  by Educational  Category
May 1992  to May 1993
Poland
Origin Stock  E  U  N
University
E  477  0.950  0.004  0.046
U  27  0.444  0.370  0.185
N  138  0.239  0.051  0.710
Postsecondary
E  323  0.941  0.034  0.025
U  25  0.360  0.320  0.320
N  95  0.358  0.105  0.537
Sec.vocational
E  1094  0.899  0.045  0.056
U  163  0.337  0.534  0.129
N  551  0.187  0.091  0.722
Sec.  general
E  507  0.897  0.024  0.079
U  94  0.394  0.362  0.245
N  461  0.085  0.041  0.874
Vocational
E  1101  0.866  0.064  0.071
U  244  0.320  0.553  0.127
N  668  0.154  0.135  0.711
Elementary
E  1427  0.839  0.025  0.137
U  198  0.212  0.545  0.242
N  2566  0.050  0.021  0.929
Incompl.  Schooling
E  171  0.749  0.006  0.246
U  8  0.250  0.250  0.500
N  672  0.024  0.003  0.973
Source:  own calculations65
Table 10
Participation  Rates,  Unemployment  Rates,  Long-term  Unemployment  Shares
for Men by Educational  Category
Poland
Educational  May 1992  May 1993
category  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU  sha-  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU
te  te  re  te  te  share
University  0.808  0.054  0.290  0.809  0.029  0.412
Postsecondary  0.832  0.079  0.429  0.813  0.046  0.500
Sec.vocation  0.795  0.094  0.308  0.804  0.080  0.347
al
Sec.general  0.596  0.096  0.174  0.596  0.092  0.409
Vocational  0.817  0.137  0.216  0.833  0.133  0.397
Elementary  0.535  0.124  0.251  0.506  0.122  0.415
Incomplete  0.334  0.069  0.500  0.274  0.042  0.600
schooling
Participation  Rates,  Unemployment  Rates,  Long-term  Unemployment  Shares
for Women  by Educational  Category
Poland
Educational  May 1992  May 1993
category  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU  sha-  part.ra-  unempl.ra-  LTU
te  te  re  te  te  share
University  0.785  0.055  0.179  0.805  0.037  0.474
Postsecondary  0.785  0.071  0.200  0.849  0.077  0.345
Sec.vocation  0.695  0.132  0.289  0.734  0.140  0.441
al
Sec.general  0.566  0.075  0.556  0.562  0.112  0.522
Vocational  0.668  0.182  0.261  0.709  0.207  0.453
Elementary  0.388  0.123  0.240  0.373  0.126  0.520
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In of Vacancies  0.07204**
(.01837)
In of Short-term  0.75627**
Unemployment  (.07655)




Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
Diagnostics:  Rbar 2: .82; S.E. of Regression:  .221.
*(**) significant  at the 5%(1%)  level  of significance.
Note: Higher-order  term, regional  and  time dummies  were included  in the regression,  but are not shown.
No. of observations:  294.67
Table 12
Czech Republic Basic Indicators
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
GDP  (billion koruny/constant  prices)  505.7  503.7  432.1  403.6  402.3
GDP (1989 = 100)  100  99.6  82.0  79.8  79.5
Industrial  output  100  96.5  73.0  63.0  58.3
In thousands
Population  (end-year)  10300  10300  10300  10300  10300  10300
Labor  force (end-year)  5626  5369  5184  5292  5121
Employment  (end-year)  5586  5147  5049  5107  4957
Unemployment  (end-year)
Persons  39379  221749  134788  185216  163877
Unemployment  rate  0.7  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2
Fiscal  balance  (% of GDP)  -2.4  0.1  -2.0  -0.5  1.4
Net domestic  publ. Debt  (% of GDP)  5.0  7.0  7.0
Net external  debt (% of GDP)  17.6  17.8
Net external  debt (billion US$)  3.5  5  4  2.7
Net debt-export  ratio (%)  50  61  36  19
Current  account  (million  US$)  -337.8  1142.7  52.9  580.0
FDI (million US$)  120.4  510.7  982.9  516.6
Portfolio  investment  (million  US$)  0  -35.8  1062.3
Rate  of inflation  (annual  average)  %  56.7  11.1  20.8  10.0
Average  wage  inflation in industry  %  16.7  22.2  23.8
Source: EBRD,  Econ.  Com.  for Europe  (1994),  own  calculations.
Table 13
Stock  of private  firms  with 0-5 dependent  employees  and -
unemployment  rate in Czech  Republic  by region  -April 1994
Region  Frequency  Percent  Freq./reg. LF  u-rate(%)**
Other  378614  51.55  0.13  4.6
"Austria"  45963  6.26  0.13  4.4
"EX-GDR"  63098  8.59  0.1  3  4.3
"Bavaria"  24132  3.29  0.13  2.2
Prague  144200  19.63  0.19  0.4
BPO*  78416  10.68  0.13  3.3
Total  734423  100.00  0.14  3.7
*BPO = Brno, Plzen and Ostrava.  **September 1994
Source: Own calculations.
"Austria" = regions in CR bordering at Austria;
"Ex-GDR" = regions in CR bordering at Ex-GDR;
"Bavaria" = regions in CR bordering at Bavaria.68
Table 14
Czech Legal Workers in West Germany* and in the Bavarian Border Regions
1990  1991  1992  1993
Czech  workers  in West Germany  13394  20927  32258  34064
Index  base 1990  100  156  241  254
As % of the total LF  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.15
As % of all foreigners  0.75  1.10  1.58  1.56
Czech  in Bavarian  border  regions  502  5871  13172  12980
Index  base  1990  100  1170  2624  2586
As % of the  total LF  0.1  0.9  2.1  2.1
As % of all foreigners  2.8  22.8  37.8  35.1
% of all Czechs  in WG  3.7  28.1  40.8  38.1
Memorandum  values
West German  LF  22368078  23173439  23530259  23122456
Index  base 1990  total  100  104  105  103
of which
Index base  1990  Germans  92  95  96  93
Index  base 1990  foreigners  8  9  9  10
Share  of foreigners  in the LF in WG  8.0  8.2  8.7  9.4
BBR  LF  596165  628424  638665  629660
Index  base  1990  total  100  105  107  106
of which
Index  base  1990  Germans  97  101  101  100
Index  base  1990  foreigners  3  4  6  6
Share  of foreigners  in the LF in BBR  3.0  4.1  5.5  5.9
Czechs  in "Werksvertrag"  in WG  6348**  11646**  595**
BBR  LF as Share  of WG LF (%)  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7
*Note:  Employment  statistics  are only  available  for the old Federal  Republic.
**Note:  Stocks  for Werksvertrag-employees  are end-of-year.  All other  stocks  are mid-year.
Source: Beschaftigtenstatistik  der Bundesanstalt  fur Arbeit,  Nuremberg.69
Annex I
Czech  ALMPs
a. Socially Purposeful  Jobs (SPJ)
The SPJ scheme  consists of two different types of programmes:  assistance  to new
entrepreneurs  and the creation  of jobs with already  existing  enterprises  (both private
and state sector). In both cases,  assistance  is only given to unemployed  people. All
proposals  for SPJ must be for newly created  jobs that have  a reasonable  chance to
be viable in the long run. Czech law states that a SPJ should last for at least two
years. There is a penalty  for not maintaining  a SPJ for that period, but it is not clear
how well  this  monitored. The  programme is  administered through the  district
employment offices. The  offices are  responsible for  distributing, funding  and
monitoring  these  jobs. Funding  is provided  in the following  three ways:
-subsidy
interest  free loan and/or
payment  of interest  on loans  taken by employer
A combination  of these payments  is also possible,  but the maximum  reimbursement
per job is 12 times  the average monthly  rate of unemployment  benefit  in the district.
Although the offices' contribution  to the cost of creating a new job is considered
marginal , it still acts as an incentive,  especially  for people starting new businesses
who lack  capital.
b. Publicly Useful  Jobs (PUJs)
PUJs offer temporary  employment  for unemployed  people  for a period of up to six
months in order to provide  work experience  to the unemployed.  PUJs  are essentially
public works jobs that are considered  beneficial  to the local community.  The district
employment  office is in charge of the administration  of the PUJs. These jobs are
mostly  supplied  by local authorities  and require  unskilled  or semi-skilled  individuals.
A large portion of these jobs is of the menial  type (e.g. street cleaning).  Benefit  can
be withdrawn for refusing a PUJ, as long as the work refused is of a  suitable
professional level and appropriate to the general circumstances  of the individual
benefit  recipient.70
PUJs are especially used for difficult groups and workers to whom an offer on the
scheme counts as an offer of suitable work. Many employment  offices use PUJ as an
instrument to test willingness to work. PUJs are generally seen as short-term and a
very small percentage of workers on this scheme stay with their employers after
completion of the PUJ.
c. Practice  for School Leavers
Under this scheme the district employment  offices pay subsidies to employers who
provide  working positions  for school leavers and graduates. In addition there may be
a modest tax relief for these employers. The aim is to help young labour market
entrants to get their first job in order to acquire practical experience. Jobs provided
should be newly created working positions. The work contract between employer
and school leaver or graduate is to be of unlimited  duration.
The programme  generally lasts one year during  which the employed has to spend at
least six months  of specialist practice corresponding  to the individual's  qualifications.
d. Re-training
Retraining necessary for  getting a job  is an aspect of the  right to  employment
created by the Employment  Act. However,  individuals have no specific entitlement to
retraining. District employment offices are responsible for  arranging retraining for
registered unemployed  people where it is an essential prerequisite  for their finding a
job. District employment  offices must take into account the current need for specific
professions in the labour market as well as the structure of the newly emerging
vacancies. Duration and achievement of a retraining programme  are not defined by
law. There are two types of retraining courses: training in job-specific skills and
training  in  general  skills  not  linked to  a  particular kind  of  job.  Under  certain
circumstances  retraining of employees is undertaken  to avoid redundancies.
Hungarian  ALMPs discussed  in the main  text44
The  Hungarian  authorities apply  a  full  menu  of  ALMPs  in  order  to  combat
unemployment.  Here are discussed only the two largest schemes (in terms of
participants)  which also have been evaluated using micro  data.
4Sources used are O'Leary (1994)  and Szemnlr (1994).71
a. Further  Training and Re-traininq
Unemployed persons interested in further training and  retraining are  normally
informed about the availability of such courses at the local employment centre.
Anyone  who is unemployed  can apply for retraining. In fact, according  to the law,
the unemployed  may be obliged to enter retraining,  but this is not in general  applied
in practice. As mentioned  in the main  text, strong  "creaming  off effects" seem to be
at work as counsellors  try to place  those with the highest  aptitude  into these training
courses.  Instead of unemployment  compensation  participants receive a slightly
higher  training subsidy  from  their local employment  centre.
b. Public Service  Employment  (PSE)
This measure is comparable  to the British Community  Programme  or the German
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaf3nahmen  (ABM) programme.  Local employment centres
finance work places, established  by firms or administrative  organs at the local level,
which  are  engaged  in  production of  goods  useful to  the  community.  The
unemployed  is obliged to take the offered place  as long as it is commensurate  with
his/her educational  and professional  background  which implies,  given that in most
cases the nature of the performed  jobs is of a low level, a selection  of participants
with characteristics  less  favourable  than  those of the average  unemployed.  To avoid
displacement of output effects the stipulation applies that only goods should be
produced  which without  subsidy  will not be produced  by the private  sector. As there
are not many  private  firms  which are yet able to fulfil the legal requirements  the large
majority  of these work places is created by local government. As mentioned  in the
main text, substitution and fiscal substitution effects seem to be present with the
application  of this scheme.
Polish  ALMPs45
a. Public  Works
Local authorities  employ  those with uninterrupted  unemployment  spells  of more than
6 months on public projects.  Most projects  are intended  to expand or maintain  the
public infrastructure.  Some workers find employment  on projects of environmental
protection  or amelioration.  The duration of these jobs cannot  exceed  six months  and
it  is the expressed intention of the government to  rotate among the long-term
45Sources:  Lehmann  (1993b)  and Polish  Ministry  of Labour  and  Social Policy  (1994).72
unemployed. It is important to note that the nature of Public Works is different from
that of pre-World-War-Two Public Works which were organised in a quasi-military
fashion. Today's Public Works are strongly decentralised and local authorities are
encouraged to  suggest worthwhile projects. There are no  nation-wide data on
average remuneration, but there is some casual evidence from Ministry of Labour
officials that people employed on Public Works might receive wages that are above
the minimum  wage.
b. Intervention  Works (Wage Subsidies)
This term is somewhat misleading. Firms (private or state-owned)  can approach the
local  employment council  (Polish:  Rada Zatrudnienia) and  ask  for  subsidised
additional work places. In order to qualify for this scheme the firm has to have more
than 10 employees and must not have released more than 10% of its workforce in
the last six months.  Again, subsidised employment  is not to exceed six months. The
state pays a wage subsidy to the firm equal to the level of benefits and often firms or
local employment  councils pay additional  wages to these  workers.
c. Further Training and Re-training
Private and public agencies are paid a fee to train some of the unemployed  who in
turn are paid an allowance (115% of benefits) while on the course. Many of these
courses have a short duration 46 and casual evidence tells us that the human capital
enhancing content of the majority of such courses might  be dubious.
d. Start-up loans
This  scheme is  comparable to  the  British Enterprise Allowance Scheme where
unemployed  are subsidised by employment  offices to start-up their own businesses.
In the Polish case, credits are granted to unemployed people which cannot exceed
20 times the average remuneration. While these grants are also given to engage in
economic activity in the agricultural sector, the use of these funds for the purchase
of land is precluded.  If after 24 months of founding a business it is still operative,
50% of the loan will be written off.  Employment  offices seem to vet applicants well
as many of the started businesses presumably survive for  more than two years.
46Steady  state calculations using administrative  data show  that in 1992  the average duration of a
training course  was for women 1.58 and for men 1.75 months (Lehmann,1993b).  The micro data of
the Labour Market Policy Supplement,  discussed  in the main text, spoke of a mean duration of 10.5
weeks. The law, on the other hand, stipulates  that training courses  for the unemployed  should under
normal circumstances  not exceed  6 months, they can in principal  last 12 months,  though.73
Most  of the started  businesses  are in the services  sector  which is underdeveloped  in
Poland. Displacement  of output effects  which, in the case of the British Enterprise
Allowance  Scheme,  are estimated  to be approximately  50% (cf. Stern, 1988)  should,
therefore,  be negligible.Annex 2  74
Employment,  labour productivity  and investment  in eastern  Germany
Productivity  in eastern Germany  has increased  since 1991 but was still lower as in
western  Germany  in 1992.47  This is due to higher  production  and lower  employment.
This trend continued  also in 1993  as can be seen in tables Al, A2 and A3.
For  mining and  the  manufacturing industry there  exists some  more  detailed
information  for the single Lander.  As net production  is not available  we take sales
and employment  data  to compute  our productivity  measure.
For most of the Lander sales from 1991 to 1992 were decreasing,  but increasing
from 1992 to 1993. Employment  shrank  in all Lander  for the whole period. The data
in table  A4 show  that productivity  increased  from 1991  to 1992 much more  than from
1992 to 1993.  This is confirmed  by more aggregated  results with net production  in
the manufacturing industry for  the whole of eastern Germany 48. Analysing the
productivity  developments  by sector Burda and Funke  found that "structural  change
will be associated  with higher aggregate  productivity  growth" 49.
Employment:
Although production has increased since the beginning of 1992, the number of
employed  has declined  from 1991  to 1993 steadily.  Only  trade and transport  and the
state sector have remained  at almost  the same levels and the service  sector gained
11  % from the first quarter of 1992 to the first of 1994. Table 2 contains detailed
figures for this last mentioned period. The increase of production  was clearly not
large enough  to compensate  the increase  in labour  productivity.
Looking  at branch level in mining and manufacturing  employment  has declined  from
1993 to 1994 in most branches.  construction  materials, wood-processing, paper
and cardboard,  printing and plastics  had positive  growth rates in employment,  with
plastics  up to 31.8%.50
47DIW Wochenbericht,  Nos  47/92  and  7/93.
48institut  fur  Wirtschaftsforschung  Halle,  Gesamtwirtschaftliche  und  untemehmerische
Anpassungsfortschritte  in Ostdeutschland,  Forschungsreihe  6/94,  p. 10.
49Burda  and  Funke,  "Eastern  Germany:  can't we  be  more  optimistic?"  Berlin,  mimeo,  August  1993,  p.
11.
50Statistisches  Bundesamt,  Fachserie  4, 4.1.1.,  June  1994,  p. 176f.75
Productivity  and investment:
Investment  flows in Eastern Germany  are very large.  Gross asset investment from
1991  to  1993  accounted for ca.  342  Billion DM. 51 Gross investment per person
increased very  rapidly in eastern Germany and  exceeded the  level of  western
Germany  in 1993. It is noteworthy  that investment  is more and more done by private
companies  while the investment undertaken  by the state is decreasing. 52
Comparing  the results of productivity development  with the intensity of investment in
1991 and 1992 one can see the positive correlation of productivity and investment.
The higher the investment intensity the higher the productivity. Also the increase of
productivity is positively correlated with the increase in investment 1991  to  1992
(table 5).
It should be clear though that productivity  does not only depend on investment.  The
increase in productivity can be got by exits of formerly state owned enterprises, as
well as the restructuring of existing companies  and entry of new enterprises. While
the second and third in general need capital investment,  the first leads to higher
productivity without it. There are no data on the number of exists and entries of
enterprises to see how important new enterprises are, but aggregate data for mining
and  manufacturing show  that  the  number of  companies decreased except  in
Sachsen - Anhalt from 1991  to 1992.  For 1992 to 1993 there is no homogeneous
trend any longer, in some of the Lander the number of companies is increasing
again.53
Whether investment into new enterprises or into existing ones is more important for
eastern Germany is not clear. Certainly in some branches new enterprises play
definitely an important role. 54 Green  field investments  are important  too, 55 because  of
their modern equipment they imply productivity levels comparable to or exceeding
western German levels. The numbers about green field  investments do not  say
51Statistisches  Bundesamt,  Zur wirtschaftlichen  und sozialen  Lage in den neuen  Bundeslandem,
March 1994, p. 42.
52lnstitut  fuir  Wirtschaftsforschung  Halle,  Gesamtwirtschaftliche  und  untemehmerische
Anpassungsfortschritte  in Ostdeutschland,  Forschungsreihe  6/94,  p. 44
53Statistische  Bundesamt:  Fachreihe  4, 4.1.1. December 1991, p. 135; Dec.1992, p. 148; Dec. 1993,
p. 178.
54J3ckel,  P, "Neue Bundeslander:  Weiterer Anstieg der Industrieinvestitionen",  ifo-Schnelldienst  No.
24/1994, p. 12.
55Jackel, P, "Neue Bundeslinder: Weiterer Anstieg der industrieinvestitionen, op. cit., p.  11.76
anything about the number of newly founded enterprises, though, as this type of
investment  can be realised in already existing companies  as well as in new ones.
Germany  has thus far pursued  a high-wage-high-technology-strategy  expressing
itself in very high investment  intensity rates. Such a strategy has produced rapid
productivity  gains but also employment  losses which in the short- and medium-run
cannot be made up by an even very large positive supply response.77
Table Al:  Gross  value added  in Eastern  Germany,  1992-1994,  in Bill.DM,  prices  of
1991
1992  1993  1994
_  Il  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I
Agr'^ult.,  -0.6  -0.5  3.5  0.5  -0.3  -0,3  3.9  0.8  -0.1
forestry
Production:  18.2  19.6  20.2  21.1  19.0  22.1  23.0  23.9  22.4
Mining  and  3.6  3.0  3.2  3.5  3.3  3.1  2.8  3.4  3.2
Energy
Manufactu-  8.3  9.1  9.2  10.4  8.5  9.9  10.7  11.9  10.3
ring
Construc-  6.3  7.6  7.9  7.2  7.1  9.2  9.5  8.6  8.9
tion
Trade and  6.6  7.1  7.0  7.7  7.2  7.7  7.6  8.2  7.7
Transport
Service  12.6  13.5  13.9  13.6  13.0  13.9  14.2  14.0  13.3
Others  11.4  11.6  11.6  11.7  11.6  11.7  11.7  11.6  11.6
Gross
Value  48.2  61.3  56.2  54.6  60.5  55.1  60.4  68.5  54.9
Added (not
adjusted)  _
Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Gesamtwirtschaflliche und unternehmerische
Anpassungsfortschritte in Ostdeutschland, Forschungsreihe  6/94, p. 7.
Table A2: Employment  in Eastern  Germany,  1992-1994,  (thousands)
1992  1993  1994
I  III  IV  I  11  III  IV  I
Agricult.,  313  290  272  251  235  229  218  218  209
forestry
Produc-  2368  2322  2308  2288  2152  2141  2143  2101  2046
tion
Trade and  1177  1162  1156  1158  1155  1154  1169  1189  1105
transport
Services  978  992  994  996  1co9  1036  1046  1065  1088
State  1596  1588  1584  1583  1585  1575  1548  1543  1544
Total  6432  6354  6314  6276  6137  6135  6124  6116  6092
Source: Institut fur Wirtschaffsforschung Halle, Gesamtwirtschaftliche und unternehmerische
Anpassungsfortschrifte in Ostdeutschland, Forschungsreihe 6/94, p. 8.
Table A3: Labour  productivity*  in Eastern  Germany:
Year  Produvctivity  Average monthly grosswage and -
Western Germany = 100  salary for dependent employed
Western Germany = 100
1991  27 8  49.1
1992  38.8  62.8
11993  46.1  68.2
* Nominal gross national product per employed person
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in den neuen
BundeslAndern, Marz 1994, p. 29 and Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Fachserie 18, Reihe
3, 2. Vierteljahr 1994, pp. 53-55.78
Table A4: Investment  Intensity*  1991-1992  and Productivity*  1991  -93  in Eastern
Germany,  (thousand  DM per employed  and %)
Investment intensit  **  Productivity
Change  Change
1991  1992  1991-92  1991  1992  1993  1991-92  1992-93
Berlin-Ost  ...  ...  54.6  93.6  123.3  71.4  31-7
Brandenburg  8.7  14.5  66.7  70.9  96.9  135.5  36.6  39.9
Mecklenburg-  6.7  19.2  186.6  64.7  120.8  164.2  86.6  35.9
Vorpommern
Sachsen  5.9  14  137.3  48  89.5  125.1  86.3  39.8
Sachsen-  7.9  15.5  96.2  65.5  113.6  142.7  73.5  25.6
Anhalt
Thuringen  5  18.6  272  40  84  127.2  110.3  51.3
* For mining and manufactoring industry, respective prices, enterprises with 20 employees and more.
**  No data for 1993.
*** No data.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 4, 4.1.1; Statistisches Bundesamt: Zur wirtschaftlichen
und sozialen Lage in den neuen BundesIandem, Marz 1994, p. 45; own calculations.79
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